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Much of contemporary philosophical work on consciousness is predicated on the assumption that work 
produced as part of the neuroscience of consciousness, the now prolific and well established research field 
within cognitive neuroscience, is neutral - or metaphysically unilluminating - with respect to theory choice 
between radically divergent theories in the metaphysics of mind. The operation of this ‘ ​neutrality assumption’ ​is 
evidenced most clearly in the methodological practices of metaphysicians and neuroscientists, who stand united 
in the assertion that questions about the metaphysics of consciousness and the details of its neural basis form 
largely independent, non-interacting research areas (Seth 2010, Howhy & Bayne 2016, Goff 2017). Left 
unchallenged, this has led interalia to the perceived viability and subsequent propagation of so-called naturalistic 
non-physicalist metaphysical accounts of consciousness, on the basis that the numerous positions falling under 
this heading are ‘‘broadly consistent with the picture of consciousness and the brain emerging from 
contemporary neuroscience’’ (Crane et al. 2015). 
In this thesis I present a case against the neutrality assumption and the view of the metaphysics of mind it 
supports. This is split into three parts. In the first, I draw out the main line of argument in favour of the 
neutrality assumption, which is introduced in Chalmers (2002, 2010) and recently developed further in Kriegel 
(​forthcoming​)​ ​. With the use of case studies from recent neuroscientific research, I present two objections to this 
argument. Together, these aim to demonstrate that the argument depends, in various ways, on an outdated and 
empirically implausible view of contemporary neuroscientific research and, in particular, its ​explanatory ​aims 
and practices. In the second part, I build on this discussion and the related work it draws upon (Revonsuo 2000, 
Neisser 2012) to motivate an alternative methodology for the metaphysics of consciousness. On this account, 
neuroscientific explanation and its’ ontological commitments play an indispensable role in metaphysical 
theorising, serving as the mutual starting constraints on an empirically adequate, naturalistic metaphysics of 
consciousness. In part III, I demonstrate how this methodological stance can be put to use, and put forward a 
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Introducing the Neutrality Assumption 
 
When it comes to the contemporary study of consciousness - understood in the familiar phenomenal sense as 
subjective experience;​ mental states for which it is ‘something it is like’ to undergo for the subjects which have 
them - two prominent fields of study lay claim. The first - analytic philosophy of mind - is unsurprising. Rooted 
in a long history and tradition, contemporary philosophical work on consciousness, focusing primarily on the 
question of consciousness’ ​ontological status,​ continues to construct and debate the viability of various 
competing metaphysical theories of consciousness. The second - neuroscience, broadly understood -  is much 
more recent. Prompted by the growing acceptance of the view that consciousness is now a suitable topic for 
serious scientific investigation, the neuroscience of consciousness has subsequently emerged as a prolific and 
well established research field in its own right. Aiming inter alia at the provision of a comprehensive and 
4 
naturalised account of consciousness’​ neurobiological basis​, the work produced as part of this research 
programme is extensive and ongoing.  
Whilst these adjacent research programmes receive significant philosophical attention individually, the 
relationship between the two has received little, if any, sustained philosophical elucidation. This thesis aims to 
begin to rectify this, and proposes to examine the relationship between these two contemporary lines of 
research. Despite its absence from mainstream discussion, a default or standard conception of the relationship 
between the neuroscience and metaphysics of consciousness has since emerged as one of ​neutrality​.  That is, 
according to proponents of the neutrality assumption, the extensive work produced as part of the neuroscience 
of consciousness is ​neutral ​with respect to theory choice between, and construction of, competing ontological 
accounts of consciousness in the contemporary metaphysics of mind. In the first instance then, the aim of this 
thesis is to elucidate and asses the justificatory basis of this standard assumption concerning the relationship 
between the neuroscience and metaphysics of consciousness.  In this chapter I set out the historical basis and 
exemplification of this neutrality claim from both a philosophical and empirical perspective, and draw out what 
I take to be its crucial dialectical function viz. to sustain the (robust) ​methodological independence​ of the 
metaphysics of mind from the neuroscience of consciousness. That is, I motivate the claim that the neutrality 
assumption concerning the relationship between the metaphysics and neuroscience of consciousness does 
crucial work in contemporary metaphysics of mind in virtue of justifying the​ methodology​ adopted in current 
debates, according to which metaphysicians are free to settle questions of consciousness ontological status 
independently from a sustained appreciation, and examination of, the details of neuroscientific work. After 
having set out this neutrality claim and its dialectical function in more detail, I finish with an outline of the 
remaining thesis, which starts from the assessment of its viability. 
1 The Metaphysics of Consciousness: An Overview 
The assumption that contemporary work on the neural basis of consciousness is ontologically indifferent 
toward the metaphysics of consciousness - the claim I call the ‘neutrality assumption’ - is widespread.   In order 
to make sense of this claim and highlight what is at stake in its acceptance or rejection, the contemporary 
dialectic in the metaphysics of mind - in which the operation of this neutrality assumption is most evident - 
requires brief explication.  Here the focus is on providing an informative overview of the main dialectical 
developments which is sufficient to introduce and make salient a number of claims about the ​methodology 
utilised and adopted in contemporary metaphysics of mind, which is to be discussed in detail in this thesis. 
 
1 1 The Empirical Case for Physicalism 
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Contemporary dialectic in the metaphysics of consciousness, restricted here to the debate over the question of 
consciousness’ ontological status, starts from the rise and widespread acceptance of physicalism. This can be 
understood (perhaps) least controversially as the view that the world’s fundamental ontology is physical. That is, 
as the metaphysical thesis that everything is, or is some sense reducible to, the physical . The rise of physicalism 1
as the dominant metaphysical worldview within the last century, while often credited to an overzealous attitude 
towards science and its future successes, is in fact attributable to an empirical argument which became available 
only within the last hundred years following a specific empirical development viz. the scientific acceptance of 
the causal completeness of physics . According to this ​causal closure argument​, modern science from the 20th 2
century onwards (as opposed to previous frameworks)  provides strong inductive reason to think that the 
physical realm is causally closed, or in other words, that something like the causal closure principle  - the thesis 
that every particular physical effect has a sufficient physical cause -  is true .  3
The causal closure principle provides us with a strong argument in favour of physicalism. If true, it implies that 
anything capable of producing physical effects - that is, capable of figuring into causal explanations for physical 
events - including the conscious​ ​mental states and properties previously postulated to explain human behaviour, 
must be given an ontological analysis in physical terms. The conclusion of the causal closure argument applied 
to phenomenally conscious properties is thus the familiar disjunctive one: either phenomenal properties are 
1Formulations of physicalism tend to differ along two dimensions, depending on how (i) the physical and (ii) the ‘some 
sense reducible to’ terms are defined (See Tiehen ​forthcoming ​and Goff 2017; chapter 1 for informative summaries). With 
respect to (i), ​theory-based​ conceptions look to define the physical in terms of the entities denoted or quantified over in 
current or future theories from physics (Chalmers 1996, 2012, Melnyk 1997, 2003, Witmer​ forthcoming​), whereas 
object-based​ conceptions characterise the physical in terms of whether the entity figures in a complete account of the 
intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects - tables, chairs and trees etc - (Jackson 1998, Stoljar 2001, 2010, Strawson 
2006). In reaction to now-standard objections raised against to these conceptions (Crane and Mellor 1990, Montero 1999, 
2012, Ney 2008), the most popular approach is now to adopt a​ negative​ conception of the physical, which attempts to 
define physical entities in terms of what they are not viz. non [fundamentally] mental (Spurret and Papineau 1999, 
Papineau 2001, Montero and Papineau 2005, Wilson 2006, Tiehen 2016) and/or entities which do not figure in value 
laden explanations (Goff 2017). With respect to (ii), replacing traditional​ supervenience-based​ conceptions of physicalism 
(Davidson 1970, Lewis 1983, Kim 1993) which have since been shown to be insufficient for the sort of metaphysical 
dependency required for physicalism (Wilson 1999, 2005, Melnyk 2003) and pre-Kripkean ​a priori entailment 
formulations, contemporary approaches look to characterise the dependency relation stated above in terms of the popular 
neo-Aristotelian relation of ​Grounding​ (Dasgupta 2014,  Audi 2012, Schaffer 2009, Rosen 2010, Goff 2017) or, more 
specifically, a [subset account of]​ ​the ​realisation relation​ (Melnyk 2003, Gillett 2002, 2003, Endicott 2012, Wilson 2005, 
2011). In this thesis I intend to be neutral between these definitions of physicalism and bring in specific formulations 
explicitly only when appropriate (see part III). I discuss ​methodological accounts​ of physicalism, which reject a purely 
metaphysical definition (Van Fraassen 2002, Ney 2008) in Chapter 3. 
2 Papineau (2000), (2002) and (2008) and Loewer (1995).  
3 See Papineau (2002, appendix) for a historical treatment of the inductive case for the causal closure principle. The case 
splits into two complementary arguments, one of which takes as its starting point the observation of successful reductive 
explanations of diverse phenomena in terms of ​a few fundamental [physical] forces​, and the other which inductively infers 
the causal closure principle from the ​lack of neurophysiological evidence​ for causally efficacious non-physical forces in living 
systems. This latter argument is crucial in the current context.  
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physical,​ and thus capable of exerting their postulated causal influence, or they are ​epiphenomenal ​viz. 
non-physical properties existing in causal isolation from the physical world. Given the counter-intuitive nature 
of the epiphenomenalist position, and the reductio arguments brought against it which exploit the 
consequences the account has for the possibility of self-knowledge (Chalmers 1996, De Brigard 2014, Moore 
2014) and/or moral responsibility (List & Menzies 2017, Kim 2007), the majority of philosophers did, and 
continue to, take the causal closure argument as decisive in favour of the physicalists’ metaphysical thesis .  4
While there is broad agreement then among physicalists that the causal closure argument demands a physicalist 
ontology, contemporary physicalists disagree on how strict the mandate of the causal closure argument is with 
respect to its conclusion. Motivated by standard multiple realisation arguments against traditional so-called 
‘reductive’ varieties of physicalism (Putnam 1967, 1975, Fodor 1974, Kitcher 1982) which seek to identify 
phenomenal properties with their physical supervient bases (Place 1956, Smart 1959, Lewis 1966), the majority 
of physicalists have since adopted a​ non-reductive ​stance . Arguably the most popular account in the 5
metaphysics of mind and special sciences, non-reductive physicalism is considered to be an attractive position 
insofar as it combines and  jointly endorses the following three claims: (i) ​efficacy​: mental properties, ​qua 
mental, can be causes and effects of other properties, (ii) ​distinctness​: mental properties are ontologically 
irreducible and non identical to physical properties and (iii) ​supervience​: mental properties nevertheless 
metaphysically supervene on, and thus can be given an ontological analysis ultimately in terms of, physical 
properties. Whilst successfully avoiding the aforementioned multiple realisation worries, non-reductive 
physicalists famously face problems of their own viz. accounting for mental causation.  Demonstrating that the 
non-reductive physicalist, in attempting to bypass the problems faced by type-identity theories, inherits the 
causal worries which plague the dualist is the mandate of the causal exclusion argument (Kim 1998, 2005). 
Taking broadly the same line of argument as the causal closure argument, this has as its conclusion that the joint 
endorsement of (i-iii) characteristic of non-reductive physicalism is untenable, and that non-reductive 
physicalists must either adopt an epiphenomenalist account of phenomenal properties - thus rejecting (i) - or 
else, a reductive type-identity physicalist - rejecting (ii) - position .  6
4 ​C.f Jackson (1982), Chalmers (2003), Robinson (2006, 2018), Stoljar & List (2017), Gibb (2015). 
5 Contemporary type-identity theorists include, inter alia, Levin (1991), McLaughlin (1999), Bechtel and McCauley 
(1999), Polger (2004), Kim [conditionally] (1998, 2005). Multiple realisation arguments against type identity theory have 
recently come under attack, and it remains an open question whether, and to what extent, the objection is successful in 
providing a compelling argument against type-identity theory in favour of a non-reductive variety of physicalism. See 
Polger and Shapiro, (2016). As such, in this thesis I treat the sort of sophisticated type-identity theory which has the 
resources to resist these standard multiple realisation objections (to be discussed in part III) as a serious ontological account 
of consciousness.  
6 The need to provide a compelling account of mental causation on behalf of the non-reductive physicalist is reflected in 
the huge amount of literature which has emerged since the exclusion argument’s introduction, much of which seeks to 
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1 2 The Anti-Physicalist Arguments 
Contemporary debate in the metaphysics of mind in the last fifty years however has been concerned primarily 
with the success of a different set of a priori arguments, which purport to refute ​all​ contemporary physicalist 
accounts of consciousness. Taking Chalmers’ (1996) hard problem of consciousness as their mandate, the 
so-called​ anti-physicalist arguments​ - typically, the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982), the explanatory gap 
argument (Levine 1983, 2001), and the conceivability argument (Chalmers 1996, 2010) -  claim to demonstrate 
that ​any​ physicalist metaphysics is ill equipped and ultimately fails to account for the reality of phenomenal 
consciousness. Their reasoning is simple. Starting from the assertion of an ​epistemic ​gap between phenomenal 
and physical descriptions - the change in Mary’s epistemic situation once she has left her black and white room, 
the negative ideal conceivability of phenomenal zombies, the lack of a priori entailment between physical and 
phenomenal truths, and so on - the familiar anti-physicalist claim is that such epistemic deficiencies are 
indicative of, and can be used to establish, an ​ontological deficiency​ within the physicalists ontology. Given that a 
physicalist metaphysics is incompatible with the presence of such ontological deficiencies, the anti-physicalist 
concludes, physicalism is false. Phenomenal consciousness, the anti-physicalist maintains, involves fundamental 
non-physical properties .  7
Since their introduction, anti-physicalist arguments have generated a huge amount of secondary literature 
which, in various ways, seeks to argue for and against their viability.  Two types of physicalist responses can 
generally be distinguished: (i) physicalists which​ deny​ the presence of a epistemic gap between physical and 
phenomenal truths (or otherwise claim that these can be easily closed), and (ii) those which​ grant​ that the 
anti-physicalist arguments succeed in establishing an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal facts but 
seek to block the anti-physicalist move from this epistemic claim to the ontological conclusion required for the 
falsity of physicalism. The later ‘a posteriori’ or ‘type-B’ physicalist response is widely considered to be the more 
promising . Development of an adequate type-B response on behalf of the physicalist is the mandate of the 8
so-called Phenomenal Concept Strategy . According to proponents of the phenomenal concept strategy, the 9
epistemic gaps which motivate the anti-physicalist arguments arise not from the non-physical nature of 
draw on contemporary metaphysical analyses of causation to block the argument’s conclusion. Philosophers adopting the 
various so-called ‘causal overdetermination’ strategies include Fodor(1989), Horgan(1997, 2001), Bennett(2003, 2008), 
Kallestrup (2006), Shapiro and Sober (2012), Woodward (2008), Yablo(1992), List & Menzies (2016) Raatiken(2010) 
Zhong(2011) Loewer (2007) Pereboom(2002), Schaffer(2003), and Sider (2003) Crisp and Warfield (2001), Block(2003), 
Carey(2011) and Roche (2014). 
7 See also Nagel (1974), Kirk (1974),  Kripke (1980), Robinson (1982, 1993), Nida-Rumelin (2007) and Goff (2011, 2017). 
8 A priori or ‘type-A’ physicalists however include: Ryle (1949), Dennett (1991), Dretske (1995), Nemirow (1990), Conee 
(1994), Jackson (2007), who usually adopt a form of analytic functionalism or behaviourism. 
9 Horgan (1984), Loar (1990, 2003), Papineau (1993, 1998, 2002), Tye (1995), Lycan (1996), Hill and McLaughlin (1997), 
Balog (1999, 2012),  Diaz-Leon (2008, 2010),  and Howell (2013).  
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experience itself, but rather from the special cognitive features implicated in our thinking about or 
conceptualisation of ​consciousness. That is, type-B physicalists maintain that our phenomenal concepts, which 
are available only to subjects which have had the relevant experience, have an especially intimate link to their 
referents - being for example, recognitional, quotational/constitutional , demonstrative or 
information-theoretic - which explain the puzzling aspects of our epistemic relation to our conscious states (e.g. 
their lack of a priori connections to physical concepts) in a manner which is consistent with physicalism. Given 
that the puzzling features serving as the initial motivation for the anti-physicalist position can be given a 
satisfactory ​physical​ explanation, the argument goes, the anti-physicalist arguments fail to pose a significant 
challenge to the physicalists position. 
 ​1 3 The Return of Two Radical Research Programmes 
An extensive and complex literature exists which concerns the success of the phenomenal concept strategy as an 
adequate response to anti-physicalist arguments . The now growing consensus however seems to be that, 10
several layers into the secondary literature,  the ontological debate has reached a stalemate.  That is, there seems 
to be compelling - but  arguably indecisive - arguments proposed on either side of the ontological divide about 
which there is no readily available consensus . As a result of this, and the assumption that there is no further 11
empirical means of settling the dispute, the focus of contemporary debate has changed. Within the 
non-physicalist camp, efforts have shifted from defense of the anti-physicalist arguments to explication of the 
alternative ​naturalistic non-physicalist ​accounts of consciousness that these arguments purport to motivate - 
typically, naturalistic property dualism, Russellian monism and contemporary forms of idealism . Here, the 12
10 Debate has focused for example, on whether the phenomenal concept strategy fails for general apriori reasons or follows 
from a two-dimensional account of modality (Chalmers 2007 c.f. Carruthers and Viellet 2007, Balog 2012), and/or 
whether the ​directness​ of phenomenal concepts raises problems for the physicalist who claims that the necessary a posteriori 
identities at issue are analogous to other cases whose falsity is similarly conceivable, yet which are presented using indirect 
concepts. Block & Stalnaker (1999) Chalmers and Jackson (2001), Chalmers (2002) Levine (2001, 2010).  According to 
one contemporary diagnosis of this dialectic however, the debate between the a posteriori physicalist and her opponent can 
be given a simpler analysis, and ultimately comes down to whether one takes phenomenal concepts to be ​revelatory, ​that is, 
whether they reveal the essential features of their referent in virtue of our being directly acquainted with them (Goff 
2017;chp5, Papineau ​forthcoming​). 
11 ​See Balog (​in press​) for an argument for the view that whether one takes the anti-physicalist arguments to be decisive in 
favour of either view will depend on which (physicalist vs non-physicalist) account one starts with. ‘‘It seems like there are 
no principles ​outside​ the physicalist and anti-physicalist systems that could settle this issue. What we have here is a puzzling 
symmetry between the two positions. The situation seems to be at a stalemate’’ (18).  Note, something like this seems to be 
the case even if one takes the revelatory diagnosis of the debate just mentioned [Balog’s diagnosis is slightly different]. Here 
too there seems to be general acknowledgement that whether one takes an introspective faculty like acquaintance which is 
required for the revelatory reading of phenomenal concepts (and, by extension, a non-physicalist conclusion), to be 
plausible and whose naturalistically inexplicable nature is unproblematic  (c.f. Papineau forthcoming) will depend on one’s 
‘bedrock’ or  starting commitments (Goff 2017; chp1, chp5).   
12 Examples of property dualists include Robinson (1982), Gibb (2015), Kroedel (2015). For panpsychism and its 
variations: Bruntrup and Jaskolla (2017),Goff (2017), Seager (2002), Strawson (2006, 2016), and the accounts outlined in 
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aim is to provide the foundations of a detailed and comprehensive alternative to the physicalists’ account of 
consciousness ​consistent with a broadly naturalistic outlook . That is, whilst philosophers working within this 13
programme take there to be compelling arguments in favour of a non-physicalist position, the view seems to be 
that proper assessment of the anti-physicalists dialectical position requires a more holistic treatment, including a 
consideration of the independent merits of the alternative theories proposed, and the capability of their 
proponents to overcome standard obstacles and internal difficulties pressed against them. 
The final dialectical development relevant to this introduction is the emergence of a second contemporary line 
of research, which attempts to make progress on the hard problem of consciousness from a different angle. 
Moving away from acceptance of the hard problem and attempting to outline potential solutions to it, the 
mandate of the so-called ‘meta-problem of consciousness’ research programme is to provide an explanation of 
why we think that that consciousness poses a hard problem to begin with. That is, explain the source of our 
problem reports​ about the hard problem, and in doing so, ‘‘shed light on its potential solutions’’ . Most of the 14
past and contemporary work within this line of research has focused on the meta-problem’s most radical 
variation, the illusion problem, whose solution is thought to support the illusionists thesis viz. that 
consciousness is an introspective illusion caused by the systematic mis-representation of physical-functional 
‘conscious’ states as having qualitative phenomenal properties which they in fact lack . For illusionists, solving 15
or providing an explanation for the meta or ‘illusion’ problem in physical terms subsumes, and indeed dissolves, 
the need to provide a solution to the hard problem on which contemporary debate has fixated. At the very least, 
its proponents claim, the illusionist thesis ought to serve as the leading explanatory hypothesis which ought to 
be ruled out before more radical alternative hypotheses (that is, those developed as part of the naturalistic 
non-physicalist research programme)  are considered.  
2 The Neuroscience of Consciousness  
Chalmers (2013). Contemporary idealists include Adams (2007), Kastrup (2017), Yetter-Chappell (forthcoming) and the 
different varieties of an idealist account described in Chalmers (forthcoming). For Russellian monism see (Goff 2017, Goff 
and Coleman forthcoming, Alter and Nagasawa 2015). 
13It is thus in the emergence of the contemporary naturalistic non-physicalist research programme that the operation of the 
neutrality assumption is most explicitly evidenced. See the quote from Tim Crane on page 14 below. 
14Chalmers (forthcoming) sets out the formal interdisciplinary research programme, however work on the meta-problem in 
various forms has been going on for a while - see Papineau (2002;chp6) and the work of  illusionists discussed below. 
15 See Frankish (2016, 2012), Dennett (2016), Granzino (2013), Humphrey (2011), Clark (2000), among others. Despite 
being a growing but still minority position,  I include the meta-problem and illusionists in my overview here for two 
reasons (a) to show the pervasiveness of the neutrality assumption in all sides of the contemporary debate (Frankish, for 
example, takes the case in favour of  illusionism to be independent of what neuroscientific work ​demands​) and (b) so that I 
can later bring in some of the methodological commitments that the (supposedly neutral)  meta-problem programme 
commits to, which I think lends evidential support to the central methodological claim defended in this thesis.  
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Whilst this debate over consciousness’ ontological status has waged in contemporary metaphysics and 
philosophy of mind, research on consciousness has taken off from a different direction. Prompted by the 
decline of the lingering behaviourist view in psychology and related fields that consciousness is ‘taboo’, and an 
unsuitable topic for serious empirical investigation, a new scientific research programme has emerged in the past 
thirty years which aims to make progress on the problem of consciousness, and develop a naturalistic account of 
its​ neural basis​, using empirical methods. As one leading neuroscientist puts it ‘‘developing a naturalized 
account of the rich experiential tapestry of consciousness is now recognized as a major objective for twenty- first 
century science’’ (Seth 2010). The so-called ‘new science’ of consciousness - which I’ll abbreviate here to the 
standard, but somewhat misleading, label ‘the neuroscience of consciousness’ - is now a large and well 
established interdisciplinary enterprise, comprised of thousands of researchers in neuroscience, psychology, 
artificial intelligence, computer science, cognitive science, neurology and psychiatry. It’s progress is tracked in 
numerous dedicated journals, organised by a centralised scientific society (The Association for the Scientific 
Study of Consciousness) and its research outputs presented each year at various large and well attended 
conferences . 16
 Here, I will briefly outline what I take to be the two central developments or broad research programmes in the 
contemporary neuroscience of consciousness which continues to comprise the majority of current research in 
the field: first, the construction of the ​Neural Correlates of Consciousness​ framework which serves as the starting 
point of the modern science of consciousness and second, the more recent attempts to develop a number of 
unified and comprehensive empirical ​theories ​of consciousness which purport to account for and explain the 
data emerging from the NCC framework in a principled and systematic manner . More detailed discussions of 17
this work, where applicable, are included later in the thesis. The purpose of this overview is to illustrate the 
extent and maturity of the research produced as part of the neuroscience of consciousness such that the claim 
serving as the starting point for this thesis is made salient in light of our previous discussion. This is the 
observation that, for the most part, contemporary literature on the metaphysical nature of consciousness fails to 
take into account (or even acknowledge) this large body of empirical research on the neural underpinnings of 
consciousness - a methodological thesis often supported by the further claim that this work is, in an important 
sense, ​neutral or unilluminating​ with respect to these metaphysical questions. This conspicuous claim about 
16Recent overviews of the field as a whole and its progress can be found in Boly et al. (2013), Block et al. (2014) and Seth 
(2010). For the ASSC, see: http://theassc.org. 
17 Other prominent research which falls within this field which I omit from this overview includes work on specific 
contents of consciousness which relate to conscious selfhood (embodied, social and otherwise), volitional agency, emotion, 
attention and dreaming and related debates on the role of consciousness is social cognition and its distribution in infants 
and non-human animals (Boly et al. 2013). 
11 
the justification for the standard methodology adopted in the metaphysics of mind (and its implications) 
demands further examination. 
2 1 The Neural Correlates of Consciousness 
The neuroscience of consciousness, at least in its contemporary manifestation, starts from the construction and 
development of the  ​Neural Correlates of Consciousness​ (NCC) research programme in the early 1990s. The 
NCC framework, introduced in a series of papers and books by Francis Crick and Christof Koch in response to 
the philosophical literature, and subsequently given a now-standard conceptual characterisation in Chalmers 
(2000), aims broadly toward identification of the ​minimal neural conditions sufficient​ for consciousness . 18
Since its introduction and formal characterisation by Chalmers, the NCC research programme has gone 
through numerous methodological, experimental and conceptual changes . It is now generally agreed, however, 19
that the NCC framework is constituted by two distinct approaches to studying consciousness, which can be 
distinguished in virtue of the aspect of conscious experience it investigates.  
The first approach, referred to as  content-specific, or ‘building block’ approaches,  aims to identify the neural 
correlates of specific conscious ​content.​ Researchers working within this paradigm aim to identify and describe 
the neural substrate or mechanism that correlates with consciousness of particular intentional objects, such as 
faces, houses etc. and has been traditionally studied via report-based visual paradigms such as binocular rivalry, 
interocular suppression and various visual masking techniques . Whilst these paradigms were integral to the 20
early pursuit of the NCC framework , they have recently been superseded by modified paradigms which aim to 
‘‘screen out’’ irrelevant neural activity relating to selective attention, self-monitoring or report, that precede or 
follow NCCs for specific contents . Standing in opposition to this approach, the second line of research 21
18 Historical precursors to the NCC framework can be found in work of british psychiatrist Henry Maudsley (1887) along 
with Herzen (1886) and Foster (1990) - see Michel (unpublished). For the initial development of the NCC programme see 
Crick & Koch (1990, 1995, 1998, 2003), Crick (1995, 1994) and Koch (2004).  The various recent experimental and 
conceptual developments within the NCC programme over the last twenty years are nicely illustrated in Rees et al. (2002), 
Tononi & Koch (2008), Koch et al. (2016) and  Howhy & Bayne (2015, 2016). The NCC programme as described here is 
crucial as it serves as the starting point for the argument in support of the neutrality assumption (see Chapter 2). 
19 See Noe and Thompson (2004a, 2004b, 2007, Searle (2005), Howhy (2009) for standard objections to the programme 
and the response in Metzinger (2000).  
20 See Tong et al. (1998), Logothetis et al. (2002), Tsuchiya and Koch (2005), Breitmeyer and Ogmen (2000). By way of 
explanation, in bincolular rivalry paradigms, distinct stimuli are presented to the eyes of a conscious subject which causes 
conscious experience to shift between the different stimuli every couple of seconds. Given that the stimuli remains constant 
in binocular rivalry paradigms, it is thought that these paradigms reveal, via fMRI, the content NCC for the specific 
content under study.  
21 See for example, Miller (2014), Aru et al. (2012) Tsuchiya et al. (2015). These so-called ‘‘no-report’’ and similar 
paradigms have led to a change in the purported location of content-specific NCCs from a fronto-parietal network 
(although to what extent this is implicated in content-specific NCCs remains contested) to posterior cortical areas (Koch et 
al. 2016). 
12 
within the contemporary neural correlates of consciousness framework aims to identify the neural correlates for 
a creature's overall ​state​ of consciousness (also called  level, full or unified field approaches). While researchers 
working on content NCC(s) aim to identify the neural conditions minimally sufficient for a specific content of 
conscious experience (‘ a face’ and so on), researchers looking to identify the state NCC(s) aim to identify the 
conditions minimally sufficient for having ​any​ conscious experience at all,  irrespective of specific contents of a 
given conscious experience . Defined formally by Howhy (2009:429) the NCC research programme can thus 22
be characterised as a conjunction of the following approaches to studying consciousness, currently in progress: 
1. NCC for conscious content​:​ the minimally sufficient neural conditions for a specific (mostly 
representational) content being conscious rather than not being conscious. 
 
2. NCC for states of consciousness:​ the minimally sufficient conditions for a creature's being in an overall 
conscious state rather than an overall unconscious state. 
 
Crucial to the operational definition of the NCC programme just outlined is the notion of ​minimally sufficient 
conditions. Introduced initially by Chalmers (2000, see also 2010;chp3), this characterisation is designed to 
allow for the possibility of there being multiple NCCs for a given state or content (sufficiency), while capturing 
the idea that the search for NCCs must be the search for the central or core aspects of the system which are 
sufficient for consciousness - as opposed to the identification of a broader, more general system which is likewise 
sufficient (minimal) . This is how the contemporary neural correlates of consciousness research programme has 23
and continues to proceed.  
 
2 2 Theories of Consciousness 
 
Thirty years on from its introduction, work produced as part of the Neural Correlates of Consciousness 
research programme continues to dominate much of the scientific literature on consciousness. It is not 
exhaustive of the field, however. Prompted by the growing need to integrate the NCC data relating neural 
systems and conscious content and conscious level respectively into a systematic and unified account of 
22 The state-based approach is thus usually studied using experimental paradigms which exploit differences between cases 
where consciousness is present (as in healthy awake volunteers - HAWs) and where it is typically absent, typically, in the 
altered levels or disorders of consciousness which arise as result of brain damage (UWS patients) and seizures, or in patients 
under anesthesia or in dreamless sleep. Key studies include Laureys et. al (2004, 2005, 2014), Owen et al. (2006) Massimini 
et al. (2005), Brown et al. (2010) Siclari et al. (2014). 
23C.f Fink (2016), who argues that the operational definition of the NCC ought to go beyond sufficiency and stipulate the 
necessity ​of the neural conditions or mechanisms at the level of phenomenal types.  
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consciousness and its cognitive function, recent work in the neuroscience of consciousness has been concerned 
with the production of numerous theoretical frameworks which aim to go beyond this early NCC research 
toward the production of comprehensive ​theories​ or models of consciousness (Boly et al. 2013). As is somewhat 
expected at this relatively early stage of research, a large number of (supposedly) competing theories and 
frameworks have been put forward. Out of these, four contemporary theories in particular have received 
sustained attention: Global Workspace Theories (Baars 1998, 2012 Dehane, Kerzberg & Changeux 2001), 
Higher Order Theories of consciousness (Rosenthal 2005), Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory (Tononi 
2004, 2008, 2012, Koch and Tononi 2008), and most recently, the attempt to extend and apply the popular 
prediction error minimisation framework (PEM) of brain function developed in cognitive science to 
consciousness (Hohwy 2012, 2013, Clark 2013, 2016) .   24
 
Whilst their proponents typically claim that these theories are comprehensive and exhaustive theoretical 
frameworks, it has been argued that as things currently stand, these are best understood with respect to the 
aspect(s) of consciousness - beyond the phenomenal - that each given theory takes as its central or starting 
explanatory target, given that these often diverge. For example, it has been claimed that Higher Order and 
Global Workspace theories, along with current research paradigms studying PEM approaches to consciousness 
are  best characterised as targeting conscious​ content​ and notions of conscious ​accessibility​ (where this access 
claim applies particularly to Global Workspace Theories). This contrasts with the aims of Integrated 
Information Theory, whose central tenets are often motivated - along with the explicit desire to tackle the  hard 
problem head on - by the clinical study and account of the difference between conscious ​levels​ and 
identification of the NCCs of state-consciousness . The relationship between these theories and their 25
explanatory goals however, especially with respect to the potential unificatory power of PEM frameworks, 
continues to be a matter of current empirical and conceptual debate .  26
 
24Other prominent accounts include virtual reality theories (Revonsuo 2000) Recurrent or ‘reentrant’ processing theories 
(Edelman 1989; Lamme 2006), the operational architectonics model (Fingelkurts 2009) along with many others.  
25Recent IIT research is discussed in chapter 2, however discussions of PEM in this context can be found in Havlik et al. 
(2017), Bucci and Grasso (2017) and Hohwy (2012, 2013), Clark (2013, 2016). For Higher Order Thought theories and its 
variations (Gennaro 1996, Rosenthal 1997, 2005), (Carruthers 2000), Lycan (1996) and Lau and Rosenthal (2011) and 
empirical support for this view: Weiskrantz (1997), Dienes (2008) and Lau and Rosenthal (2011) (c.f. Block 2007, 2009). 
For GWS see originally Baars (1998, 2005) followed by Dehaene and Naccache (2001), Dehaene and Changeux (2004, 
2005, Shanahan 2008). 
26 This characterisation of the relation between competing theoretical frameworks is given in Seth (2017) and Howhy 
(2016). Whether these are genuinely competing (that is, mutually exclusive) accounts of consciousness, or whether their 
central claims and experimental evidence can be subsumed under a broader framework remains an open question, hindered 
by the current lack of precision and available testable predictions these frameworks currently generate (Boly et al. 2013, 
Howhy 2016). For some specific proposals for combining PEM approaches and GWS and IIT  however, see (Howhy 2013 
pp 211-214) and (Bucci & Grasso 2017). 
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3 The Neutrality Assumption 
 
As should be evident from the overviews just given, contemporary research in the neuroscience and metaphysics 
of consciousness both operate in widespread ​methodological independence ​from one another. That is to say, 
researchers working within these fields take themselves to be pursuing very different lines of work - albeit on the 
same subject - whose parallel developments have little, if any, immediate significance for their field. Within the 
neuroscience of consciousness, this can be seen right from the beginning, in the motivations given for the initial 
construction of the NCC programme. The objective in this case was clear, namely, to set aside the hard problem 
of consciousness dominating  philosophical discussions of consciousness at the time, which asked ​why and how 
a given set of physical processes can give rise to consciousness, and instead work to identify the minimum set of 
neural processes with which it is systematically correlated . This distinction between what we might call the 27
‘why’ and the ‘what’ questions of consciousness as a way of understanding the distinction between the 
metaphysical and neuroscientific research programmes remains influential in the contemporary scientific 
psyche .  28
 
My primary concern however is the philosophical dialectic, whose widespread methodological independence 
from neuroscientific work on consciousness is unmistakable. Whilst philosophical contributions have 
undoubtedly been integral to the construction of the science of consciousness, and continue to play an active 
role in its conceptual development, the substantial empirical work on consciousness which these philosophical 
contributions target have failed to influence, and are not reflected in, the metaphysical debate on consciousness 
which has developed alongside it. Both in the construction and subsequent defense of competing ontological 
theories - varieties of physicalism, non-physicalism and illusionism alike - the focus has been almost exclusively 
on discussion of various a priori arguments (the exclusion argument, anti-physicalist arguments and the 
phenomenal concept strategy, the combination problem - the list goes on). The metaphysical debate over 
consciousness’ ontological status has stayed silent on these recent empirical developments. Furthermore, given 
the current pursuit of the naturalistic non-physicalist research programme along with recent a priori debates 
over the viability of illusionist approaches to consciousness, this methodological practice looks to continue.  
 
27 See Crick and Koch (2003;1): ‘‘It appears fruitless to approach this problem [the hard problem] head-on. Instead, we are 
attempting to find the neural correlate(s) of consciousness (NCC), in the hope that when we can explain the NCC in 
causal terms, this will make the problem of qualia clearer’’. 
28 See for example, Seth (2010): ‘‘​Perhaps the key factor in the transition to scientific legitimacy was the realization that it 
may not be necessary to explain ​why​ consciousness exists in order to begin to unravel the physical and biological 
mechanisms that underlie its various properties. After all, physicists have laid bare many mysteries of the universe without 
accounting for the brute fact of its existence’’. 
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This observation is striking. The philosophers working on the metaphysics of consciousness are obviously well 
aware of this neuroscientific research. So what explains the absence of discussion of this empirical work in 
mainstream metaphysical debate? A natural thought is that it might be unreasonable to expect metaphysical 
theories of consciousness, as the product of a soley a priori enterprise which is concerned with a set of more 
abstract and fundamental questions regarding the nature and metaphysical constitution of consciousness, to be 
sensitive to these kinds of empirical considerations.  If this were the case, then the lack of acknowledgement and 
attention to the recent neuroscientific work on behalf of metaphysicians of mind would make sense. However, a 
brief look at the historical developments pertaining to causal closure outlined above suggests that this is clearly 
not the case. With causal closure, we have a clear case in which empirical developments, namely, those 
implicated in the inductive arguments for the causal closure principle - one which, incidentally, is based on 
findings from ​modern neuroscience​ - have had a profound effect on the dialectical landscape in the metaphysics 
of mind. Here, a posteriori developments - both in the special sciences as well as physics - changed the 
theoretical set up completely, being responsible for the dominance of physicalism as the now default 
metaphysical view, the almost blanket rejection of interactionist dualism and, perhaps most interestingly, the 
subsequent demand on competing non-physicalist theories to accommodate the causal closure principle within 
their frameworks .  29
 
It is not the empirical, a posteriori nature of the neuroscientific research programme which stops it from 
entering mainstream contemporary metaphysical discussions. So what is it, then? What justifies the claim that 
we can, in simple terms, explicitly take on board everything neuroscience is telling us about the neural basis of 
consciousness yet end up with radically different metaphysical accounts of its nature?  The justificatory 
explanation often given is as follows. That, beyond the developments pertaining to causal closure, the recent 
empirical work produced as part of the neuroscience of consciousness is, in an important sense, ​neutral or 
unilluminating​ with respect to these metaphysical issues. That is, it is claimed that the competing metaphysical 
accounts of consciousness are ​equally compatible​ with the work emerging from contemporary neuroscience - in 
a manner in which interactionist dualism was ​not​ with respect to the relevant work in the case for causal closure 
- given that this research is, metaphysically speaking, neutral or unbiased. On this view, the exclusively a priori 
nature of contemporary debate, despite the construction of the new science of consciousness, has a simple 
29That is, those who reject physicalism do not tend to do so on the basis of rejecting the empirical case for causal closure - 
for example, by claiming that the distinctly a priori nature of metaphysical inquiry rids us of the demand to accept causal 
closure - but rather on the basis that the causal closure principle can instead be accommodated within alternative 
non-physicalist metaphysical frameworks (see for example Goff 2017). A more detailed account of the meta-metaphysics of 
mind which is suggested by this discussion is offered in Chapter 3.  
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explanation: that the work produced from this research field thus far is silent with respect to the metaphysical 
debates over phenomenal consciousness and its ontological status.  
 
This neutrality claim is implicit in much of the contemporary philosophical dialectic above. As suggested, it is 
evidenced in the continued reliance on a priori considerations to settle the ontological disputes at the heart of 
current debate, along with the view that both modern non-physicalist theories and illusionist approaches are 
broadly consistent with a neuroscientific view of the mind and consciousness. However, the view can also be 
found explicitly stated in a number of recent papers. In the interests of clarity, and to make the target of this 
thesis clear, I quote three instances of this here : 30
 
In her forthcoming discussion of the perceived ontological stalemate holding between physicalists and their 
opponents, Katalin Balog writes:  
 
‘‘It is unlikely that this stalemate can be broken by empirical evidence either. We have good reason to think that 
non-interactionist property dualism and physicalism ​are equally compatible with all empirical evidence. ​…  Of 
course, it could turn out that the physical is not causally closed and they are both wrong on this issue, but 
nothing so far points strongly in this direction’’  
 
 ‘‘For physicalism to be true, phenomenal properties must have “neural correlates”....Because the 
non-interactionist property dualist – like the physicalist –believes that the physical is causally closed,​ she is 
equally committed to the existence of such neural correlates.’’  
(Balog, in press;19; emphasis and [] added). 
 
From within recent philosophical contributions to the science of consciousness, a similar claim can be found in 
Tim Bayne and Jakob Howhy’s recent review and commentary of developments in the NCCs programme: 
 
‘‘The disagreement about the metaphysics of consciousness has little direct bearing on the NCC project, for all 
that requires is that certain neural states ‘underlie’ consciousness’’ 
 ​(Bayne and Howhy 2016;4). 
 
30 However see also Wu (forthcoming;7), along with the more comprehensive discussions in the papers introduced  in 
Chapter 2.  
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And finally, in the research statement outlining the objectives of the New Directions In the Study of Mind, the 
the recent research project at the University of Cambridge which has funded the development of naturalistic 
non-physicalist frameworks, Tim Crane and colleagues write that: 
 
‘‘The current project rejects this assumption[that the empirical study of consciousness demands the truth of 
physicalism]. It will maintain that the scientific investigation of the mind—by psychology and 
neuroscience—does not require that physicalism is true. One of the distinctive features of this project, then, is 
the ​combination of a skeptical attitude to physicalism with a fully scientific approach to the mind​’’.  
 
(Crane et al. 2015; 3; emphasis added). 
 
 
4  The Dialectical Function 
 
The dialectical situation then, is as follows. Contemporary metaphysicians of mind - along with many 
neuroscientists working on consciousness - adhere to the following assumption: 
 
The Neutrality Assumption: ​Work produced as part of the neuroscience of consciousness is neutral, or 
metaphysically unilluminating, with respect to theory choice and construction in the metaphysics of 
consciousness.  
 
This explains the acceptance of, and justifies the following claim: 
 
Robust Methodological Independence: ​The metaphysics of mind - concerned with construction and theory 
choice between competing metaphysical accounts of consciousness - ought to operate in widespread 
independence from empirical developments in the neuroscience of consciousness. 
 
It is important to note that this latter methodological claim is ​robust​ -it applies to​ all​ of the relevant 
neuroscientific and metaphysical work and theories (beyond closure) and is thought, at least ​prima facie, ​to 
have some degree of temporal infragility . If broadly correct, this suggests the following, that the neutrality 31
31That is, the view seems to be not only that ​current ​neuroscientific research on consciousness is neutral in this way but 
also, that this was so in the past and is also likely to remain the case in the near future - such that metaphysicians are justified 
in not continually looking for emerging empirical work which might bear on the relevant ontological questions (C.f. 
Chp2,3). 
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assumption is crucial for contemporary metaphysics of mind, and does significant philosophical work in 
current debate, in virtue of justifying its standard methodological practices viz. those which  fail to engage in 
sustained consideration of emerging empirical work on consciousness and its neural basis, and take such an 
approach to be justified.  
 
5 Overview of Subsequent Chapters 
 
The mandate for the thesis then is to address the following questions: (i) what argument(s) support this 
neutrality claim?  (ii) are they convincing? And (iii) if not, what does this mean for robust methodological 
independence? Chapter 2 addresses (i) and (ii). Chapter 3 discusses (iii), and proposes an alternative 
methodological approach. Chapter 4 examines the applications of this alternative methodological framework 
and the implications this might have, when put to use, for contemporary metaphysics of mind. 
Chapter 2: The Neutrality Argument 
The main line of argument in support of the neutrality assumption can be traced back to David Chalmers 
(2002, 2010). This takes as its starting point the Neural Correlates of Consciousness research programme. After 
providing a further exposition of this programme and Chalmers’ argument, I examine the recent development 
and elaboration on this line of argument proposed by Uriah Kriegel (​forthcoming​). Together, these form what I 
call the ‘neutrality argument’ in favour of the neutrality assumption examined in this thesis. Drawing on recent 
work in philosophy (Neisser 2012, Vernazzani 2015, 2016) and neuroscience (Revonsuo 2000, Tononi et al. 
2014), I present and examine two  related objections to this argument. Together, these aim to demonstrate that 
the success of the neutrality argument depends, in various ways, on an outdated and empirically implausible 
view of contemporary neuroscientific research and, in particular, its explanatory​ ​aims and practices. I conclude 
that, in the absence of available alternative arguments for the neutrality, assumption, this claim and, by 
extension, the methodological thesis that the metaphysics and neuroscience of consciousness ought to operate 
independently, lack adequate justification.  
Chapter 3: Towards a Neuroscience-First Metaphysics of Mind 
In the next Chapter I build on this discussion and the related work it draws upon to motivate and present an 
alternative ‘Neuroscience-First’ methodology for the metaphysics of consciousness. This takes as its starting 
point the recognition that the question at the heart of the thesis - namely, that of the correct account of the 
relationship between the metaphysics and neuroscience of consciousness - is an instance of the broader 
meta-metaphysical​ issue of the relationship between metaphysics and science more generally, and as such, ought 
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to be illuminated by recent developments in this field. After detailing two such developments viz. (i) the recent 
emergence of work in the metaphysics of neuroscience, and (ii) the prominent methodological naturalist 
analysis of metaphysics in terms of ​inference to the best explanation ​(L.A.Paul 2012), I use these to construct a 
case in favour of a novel methodological approach to debates over consciousness’ ontological status. This takes 
as central the claim that a Neuroscience-First approach to the metaphysics of consciousness - on which the 
metaphysical commitments of neuroscience and its explanatory practices serve as the ​mutual starting constraints 
on a metaphysics of consciousness - is not only a potential alternative to methodological independence, but is 
demanded by acceptance of, and reflection on, the minimal claim that candidate metaphysical theories of 
consciousness be ​empirically equivalent​. I conclude by using this discussion to reinforce and restate my case 
against Chalmers’ neutrality argument, and situate this approach in the context of the recent arguments for 
naturalised metaphysics. 
 Chapter 4: An Application: The Neural Mechanisms of Consciousness 
In the final Chapter, I demonstrate how this novel methodological approach can be put to good use in the 
metaphysics of mind. Taking a mechanistic interpretation of the Neural Correlates of Consciousness 
programme (Revonsuo 2000, Neisser 2012, Vernazzani 2015) introduced in Chapter 1 as a natural starting 
point, I argue that attention to the metaphysical commitments of such a programme can be used to draw a 
negative conclusion with respect to contemporary theories in the metaphysics of mind. More specifically,  I 
motivate the claim that the standard account of the metaphysical dependency relation holding between neural 
mechanisms and the phenomenon they explain (provided by recent philosophy and metaphysics of 
neuroscience) provides the resources to construct novel case against of type-identity theory (Polger 2006, Polger 
and Shapiro 2016). I conclude by situating these arguments in relation to the more familiar concerns pressed 
against these accounts of consciousness viz. Those relating to to multiple realizability and mental causation. As 
tools to secure the ​empirical equivalence​ of metaphysical accounts of consciousness (a result of the 
Neuroscience-First Approach in Chapter 3), I argue that such considerations ought to be taken as importantly 















In Chapter 1 I explained and motivated the claim that the neutrality assumption does crucial work in the 
contemporary metaphysics of mind in virtue of justifying the latter’s methodological independence from the 
neuroscience of consciousness. But what reasons are there for thinking that this assumption and, by extension, 
the standard methodological approach adopted in current debate, are in fact justified? As we have seen, in all 
major treatments of the metaphysics of consciousness found in recent literature, the neutrality assumption has 
received little, if any, attention. Where it is stated explicitly, as in the passages outlined in the previous chapter, 
the view is often asserted with little or no explanation; a claim which is striking given that historical 
developments suggest that metaphysical theories ought to be sensitive to these sorts of empirical developments.  
 
In this chapter I shall demonstrate that these recent statements of the neutrality assumption can be traced back 
to a single line of argument which, if successful, provides an adequate justification of the neutrality assumption. 
This appears first in contemporary dialectic within the series of papers David Chalmers uses to outline his 
prescriptive account of a science of consciousness (1996, 2000, 2004). Whilst this argument has gone largely 
unscrutinised, the need for its further support and elaboration has been recognised by Uriah Kriegel who gives 
the argument a renewed treatment in a forthcoming paper.  This ‘neutrality argument’ takes as its starting point 
the ​neural correlates of consciousness ​(NCC) research programme which, as discussed in the previous chapter, has 
gone on to dominate much of the neuroscientific work on consciousness in the past two decades. After setting 
this argument out, I claim that this faces two serious objections, on the basis of which, I argue, we can infer its 
inadequacy,  and conclude that - as matters currently stand - the neutrality assumption and, by extension, robust 
methodological independence, lack adequate justification. 
 
1. The Neutrality Argument  
 
1 1 David Chalmers’ Neutrality Argument 
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The need for a neutrality argument, as opposed to merely asserting the neutrality ​assumption​, was first 
recognised in contemporary dialectic by David Chalmers in the series of papers he used to outline his 
prescriptive account of a science of consciousness (1996, 2000, 2004). For Chalmers, the ultimate aim of a 
science of consciousness is to infer ​fundamental principles ​connecting third person neural and behavioural data 
about the brain and first person data concerning consciousness collected indirectly via verbal reports . That is, 32
despite making a strong case for taking the neural correlates of consciousness as its’ immediate centerpiece, 
Chalmers does not think that the successful identification of the NCC(s) is the end goal of the science of 
consciousness. In his prescriptive account of the science of consciousness (2004, 2010) he proposes two further 
projects for a science of consciousness beyond the completion of the NCC programme. First, Chalmers 
proposes that the next step for neuroscientists after the identification of the NCC(s) will be to work towards 
systematising​ the connection between first and third person data suggested by the NCC programme. As 
described in the previous chapter, the NCC paradigm is usually conducted in a disunified and fragmented way, 
divided between two approaches and working within distinct experimental paradigms. Systemation as 
prescribed by Chalmers would thus involve the unification of these approaches and the NCC(s) they identify, 
such that, if successful, we would be able to test or predict aspects of conscious experience based on an 
examination of an organism's neurophysiology.  The final step for a science of consciousness according to 
Chalmers, is to infer a number of​ fundamental principles​ from these systematic connections. While it is difficult 
to tell exactly what Chalmers’ means by this, he argues that these principles will be simple, unified and, most 
importantly, maximally general in scope such that they apply to ​all​ aspects of ​any​ conscious system. For 
Chalmers, the production of these simple law-like principles is the ultimate goal for a science of consciousness.  
 
What would the construction of these principles tell us about the metaphysics of consciousness? Chalmers 
argues that the identification of these law-like principles would not, by themselves, give us a completed theory 
of consciousness because these principles​ leave open ​or ​underdetermine ​a metaphysical account of 
consciousness. Viewed as correlations, these principles are compatible with numerous metaphysical theories of 
consciousness and thus, are neutral with respect to them. It is open for the physicalist, for example, to argue that 
the existence of these fundamental, systematic principles are indicative of identity relations obtaining between 
neural and conscious states. Yet the existence of the fundamental systematic principles connecting third and 
first person relata can equally be thought to support other metaphysical accounts of the relationship between 
consciousness and brain states; the principles could - as Chalmers himself suggests - be used to support the 
32 Cf. Dennett (2001) ‘​The Fantasy of First Person Science​’. 
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existence of psychophysical bridging laws connecting physical and nonphysical domains, or alternatively, the 
claim that physical processes ​cause ​consciousness, and so on. 
 
In sum, the idea that Chalmers puts forward is that the fundamental principles - inferred eventually from the 
work compiled as part of the NCC programme - ​leave open​ or underdetermine a metaphysical account of 
consciousness. Taken as correlations, one can claim that neuroscience, in so far as it aims at these principles, is 
neutral with respect to metaphysics of consciousness: 
 
‘‘​For many purposes, the science of consciousness can remain neutral with respect to these philosophical questions. One can 
simply regard them as principles of correlation, while staying neutral on their underlying causal and ontological status​’’ 
(2010:47).  
 
There are three important features of Chalmers’ formulation of the neutrality argument. Foremost, is his 
account of the neutrality (of neuroscience) being a result of the neutrality of ​correlational facts,​ which are 
compatible with numerous underlying causal or ontological relations. Second, is that Chalmers’ neutrality 
argument is intended to be applied to a completed science of consciousness, and is therefore based around 
principles which have not yet been uncovered (if, indeed, they can be). As such, it does not obviously bear on 
the question of whether ​current​ neuroscience is similarly neutral . Finally, a striking feature of Chalmers’ 33
argument comes from its’ fleeting position in his overall account of a science of consciousness, and the rigorous 
treatment of consciousness presented in his book. The argument is only introduced briefly at the end of the 
chapter outlining the projects and problems for a science of consciousness. Whilst it is suggested that the topic 
will be taken up in later chapters (2010, 47) after an extensive treatment of the NCC programme, the discussion 
moves straight on to the ontological debate on consciousness. The relationship between the neuroscience of 
consciousness and the metaphysics, and further defense of the neutrality view that is proposed, is left 
undiscussed. Given how far the neuroscience of consciousness as a field has expanded,  and the crucial role this 
assumption plays in contemporary metaphysics of mind, the need for a justificatory argument to establish the 
neutrality assumption introduced by Chalmers is imperative. 
 
1 2 Uriah Kriegel’s Neutrality Argument 
 
33 ​However, as I will suggest below, we can construct a formulation Chalmers’ neutrality argument which does so based on 
the generalisation of the above to all [current and future] neuroscientific work.  
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The task of providing a more comprehensive and up to date defense of the neutrality assumption has been taken 
up by Uriah Kriegel, who gives the argument its most extensive treatment in a forthcoming paper .  Observing 34
similarly that the centerpiece of the science of consciousness is the NCC research programme, Kriegel’s 
argument starts from the claim that the NCC research programme as outlined above is problematic from a 
philosophy of science perspective. The motivation for Kriegel’s formulation of the neutrality argument is thus 
the thought that science places intellectual demands on neuroscience, such that a scientific study of 
consciousness framed only in terms of correlations - whose systematic existence is left unexplained - is 
unsatisfactory. That is, Kriegel claims, if the NCC programme is to be a properly scientific enterprise it must go 
beyond the ​identification of the neural correlates​ of consciousness toward the provision of ​explanations​ of their 
existence. To limit the scientific study of consciousness as the search for correlations would be to render the 
existence of the correlations brute and inexplicable which, Kriegel claims, runs contrary to scientific practice .  35
 
As such, Kriegel identifies six possible explanations for the correlation(s) identified by the NCC research 
programme, which he cashes in terms of constitutive or causal relations. An explanation for the correlation 
between a given conscious experience and its’ neural correlate, neutral between state and content NCC 
approaches, will either be ​causal​ (consciousness is constituted by the NCC), r​everse causal​ (the NCC is 
constituted by consciousness), ​third causal​ (consciousness and the NCC are both caused by some third 
element), ​constitution​ ( consciousness is constituted by the NCC),  r​everse constitution​ (the NCC is constituted 
by consciousness) or ​third constitutor ​(consciousness and the NCC are both constituted by some third element). 
After laying these out as the most plausible explanations for the correlational facts identified by the NCC 
programme, Kriegel argues that each explanation maps onto a familiar position in the metaphysics of mind. 
These are as follows : 36
 
Causation -- Naturalistic Dualism (​epiphenomenalism​) 
34 ​‘Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness’. Forthcoming in U.Kriegel (eds.) ​Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of 
Consciousness​.   
35 ​As such, Kriegel seems to disagree with the qualification made by Chalmers that such correlations (when systematically 
reduced to fundamental principles) might reasonably be taken as​ fundamental​ or primitive, in a way analogous to other 
fundamental laws in physics. For if this was correct, then no further explanation of the NCC correlations would be 
required.  
36 I think there are a number of potentially serious problems with Kriegel’s mapping of metaphysical theories with causal 
and constitutive relations in this way. To take one example, it is highly controversial to state that the metaphysical 
dependency relations used to characterise naturalistic dualism (nomological supervenience etc.), for example, are instances 
of diachronic ​causal​ relations (cf. Koslicki 2016, Bernstein 2016). Neither are we beholden to accept the claim that 
constitution relations entail​ identity​ relations (as seen in the familiar puzzles of material constitution e.g. in Lewis 1976). 
Here however, I grant Kriegel characterisation and focus on the implications of the argument, if successful, for the 
construction of a viable neutrality argument.  
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Reverse Causation -- Non-naturalistic dualism (​interactionist dualism​) 
Third Causation --Neutral Dualism (​not defended​) 
Constitution -- Physicalism (​a priori & a posteriori physicalism​) 
Reverse Constitution -- Idealism (​reductive and eliminative idealism​) 
Third Constitutor -- Neutral Monism (​Russellian monism​) 
 
Kriegel’s defense of the claim that the neuroscience of consciousness is neutral with respect to the metaphysics 
of consciousness follows from his assertion that, once these possible explanations are laid out, there is no 
scientific​ way of distinguishing or choosing between them. Broadly speaking, when assessing the viability of 
different explanatory hypotheses for a given phenomenon -viz. theory choice - science proceeds by first asking 
which explanatory hypotheses best accommodates the empirical data. In other words, the hypotheses are 
assessed for empirical adequacy. This is typically done by constructing experimental paradigms designed to 
exploit ​discordant predictions​ or observational consequences​ ​of the hypotheses under consideration. This allows 
researchers to distinguish between the competing explanatory hypotheses for a given phenomena, keeping those 
which best fit the newly acquired data .  37
 
Kriegel’s neutrality argument then is that, in the case of the competing metaphysical explanatory hypotheses 
outlined above, we are unable to assess or choose between the explanatory hypotheses for the NCC in this way. 
Examining two ‘empirical symptoms’ or discordant predictions that might be used to distinguish between 
naturalistic dualism and physicalism - time lag and mediating mechanism respectively - Kriegel argues that there 
are both serious technological and philosophical barriers to testing these empirically . In the absence of the 38
empirical data which can be used to distinguish between dualism and physicalism, he concludes that there is no 
hope for a scientific resolution to the choice between the metaphysical explanatory hypotheses; the science of 
consciousness, constituted on this view by NCC research,  is neutral with respect to the metaphysics of mind .  39
37 See Chp3.3 for further discussion. 
38 ​This follows from the claim that diachronic causes usually ​precede​ their effects in addition to the claim that causes are 
usually mediated by ​mechanisms​ involving fine grained causal transactions, whereas constitutive relations typically do not. 
Considering time lag, Kriegel provides three problems (a) a technological barrier concerning temporal resolution required 
to test the hypotheses (b) the supposed unobservability of causation (c) the inability to control for measuring time. For 
causal mediating mechanism Kriegel argues that this is problematic in this instance as this does not apply to causal relations 
occurring at the fundamental level, which naturalistic dualism is concerned with. This thus cannot be used to distinguish 
empirically between epiphenomenalism and physicalism understood by Kriegel as involving causal and constitutive 
explanatory hypotheses. (Here, Kriegel seems to be implicitly relying on a mechanical account of causality Glennan 1996). 
39 ​Kriegel also includes a discussion of ​theoretical ​neutrality (22,24), but I leave this out of my discussion here.  
25 
 
Key to Kriegel’s neutrality argument is his expansion of Chalmers account of neutrality as a matter of 
‘compatibility’ of correlational facts with numerous metaphysical interpretations, to an account of the 
neutrality of these facts being as a result of their ​empirical equivalence​. Kriegel’s account of neutrality in this 
context can be summed up as follows: 
 
Neutrality as empirical equivalency: A  set of scientific facts can be said to be neutral with respect to a set of 
metaphysical theories (T​1, ​T​2​, T​3​.. T​x​) iff that set of facts fails to produce ​empirical evidence ​(viz. a set of 
discordant predictions) on the basis of which we could positively distinguish between them. 
 
Like Chalmers’ argument, Kriegel’s neutrality argument has a number of important features. First, it 
demonstrates that the neutrality exhibited between the neuroscience and metaphysics of consciousness is 
contingent and temporally fragile. According to Kriegel, it​ just so happens​ that there are obstacles to the 
production of relevant experimental paradigms which exploit the discordant predictions of the competing 
metaphysical explanations proposed for the correlation (which would allow us to choose between competing 
metaphysical theories). That is, as it stands, Kriegel’s argument fails to establish a neutrality claim which is 
robust​; the neutrality of neuroscience might change if more work was put into designing such paradigms, 
thinking up new discordant predictions that the metaphysical explanatory hypotheses might generate, or if and 
when neuroimaging and other experimental techniques improve in the future . Second, another important 40
feature of Kriegel’s argument is his characterisation of scientific explanation exhaustively in terms of single 
causal and constitutive​ relations. While this is useful for Kriegel’s purposes in so far as it limits the scope of 
discussion to a manageable number of hypotheses which can be later mapped onto metaphysical accounts, I 
think there are strong reasons to think that bare stipulation of constitutive and causal relations are neither 
exhaustive exemplars of (neuro)scientific explanation nor reflective of the notion of explanation at work in 
neuroscientific practice . 41
 
1 3 A General Outline 
 
While there are a number of  important differences in the formulations of the neutrality argument presented by 
Chalmers and Kriegel, they both exhibit the same general structure: 
40Kriegel does admittedly express doubt at the prospect of this (22,25), but it is not altogether clear that this pessimism is 
justified. It seems difficult, for example, to predict in advance what the relevant technological developments will be, and 
thus, why we should rule out the testability of these competing metaphysical hypotheses in advance. 
41 See sections 2 and 3. 
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1. Neuroscience as it pertains to the study of consciousness discovers correlational facts. 
2. Correlational facts are metaphysically neutral with respect to competing metaphysical theories of mind. 
3. Therefore the neuroscience of consciousness is neutral with respect to the metaphysics of mind. 
 
 
As described, both formulations of the neutrality argument start with the NCC research programme, 
characterised by its search for the identification of the neural correlates of conscious experience (that is, a set of 
correlational facts) . It is then the neutrality of ​these ​correlational facts which is used to establish the neutrality of 
neuroscientific practice with respect to the metaphysics of mind. This is supported either by an appeal to the 
broad compatibility of such facts with the divergent metaphysical accounts of consciousness (Chalmers) and/ 
or with the latter's empirical equivalence due to a failure to test for discordant predictions (Kriegel). Taken as 
the cornerstone for the scientific study on consciousness, this neutrality conclusion as it relates to the NCC 
programme is then generalised to include ​all​ neuroscientific work on consciousness, and thus the robust 
neutrality assumption outlined in the introduction is established. This general structure provides a firm starting 
point from which the viability of the neutrality argument in favour of the neutrality assumption, as it previously 
been presented, can be assessed.   
 
2. Two Problems for the Neutrality Argument 
 
There are strong ​prima facie​ reasons for accepting the second premise of the neutrality argument. The 
metaphysical neutrality of correlational facts is relatively uncontroversial, and Kriegel’s forthcoming account of 
neutrality as empirical equivalence due to discordant predictions serves as a plausible example of how the 
premise can be defended under closer examination . However, I shall argue that this is not true of the first 42
premise of the neutrality argument as defended by Kriegel and Chalmers. In the remainder of the chapter I raise 
and discuss two objections which suggest that the claim serving as the first premise of the argument, namely, 
42 That being said, I also think there is a case to be made for a further examination of the second premise of the argument. If 
the neutrality argument is to be supported in the manner required to establish the neutrality assumption as it operates in 
contemporary debate, Kriegel’s argument would require further elaboration and treatment. Minimally, the argument 
would require that it was established that ​all​ of the metaphysical explanatory hypotheses Kriegel outlines (assuming, not 
uncontroversially that these correspond to the metaphysical account of consciousness that is required, c.f. Footnote 5) are 
empirically equivalent in the way that Kriegel argues is true of physicalism and epiphenomenalism (that is, as it stands, 
Kriegel’s argument is currently invalid given that he does not defend the empirical equivalence of all competing accounts). 
This seems to be a potentially fruitful line of research that is worth pursuing. However, given that my aim here is to discuss 
what I see as stronger objections to the neutrality argument, I do not pursue this objection to Kriegel’s defense of premise 2 
of the neutrality argument, which would add weight to my conclusion, any further here.  
27 
that neuroscience as it pertains to the study of consciousness discovers ​correlational facts,​ is false.  These are as 
follows. First, that we have good reason to think that the correlational account of the neural correlates of 
consciousness programme which this argument relies on is mistaken. That is, an alternative and more plausible 
characterisation or interpretation of the programme exists according to which the NCC is best understood as 
the search for​ causal or constitutive​ facts which are not neutral in the manner required to establish the 
argument’s conclusion. Second, I will argue that even this first objection can be resisted,  the neutrality 
argument detailed by Chalmers and Kriegel fails because - as alluded to in the introduction - the neural 
correlates of consciousness research programme is no longer ​exhaustive​ of neuroscientific work on 
consciousness. If prominent empirical work exists which falls outside of this programme and, moreover, which 
similarly resists correlational analysis, then premise one is false. I detail a case study of work which meets these 
two conditions. I finish with a discussion of the large problem I take these two preliminary objections to be 
indicative of viz. a failure in previous discussions of this issue to appreciate the explanatory and metaphysical 
implications of neuroscientific work on consciousness, the denial of which, I shall later argue, is becoming 
increasingly implausible.  
 
2 1 Are the NCCs Correctly Characterised as Correlational? 
 
Premise one of the neutrality argument as I have outlined it relies on the claim that the NCC programme is 
correctly characterised as searching for ​correlational facts​ relating first and third person data. The first objection 
to be pressed to this neutrality argument then, is that there is strong case available against this original 
correlational characterisation of the NCC which, if correct, renders the neutrality argument unsound (Neisser 
2012, Vernazzani 2015, Revonsuo 2000). This line of argument takes as its starting point the observation that 
current philosophical discussions of the science of consciousness and its relation to the standard metaphysical 
debates suffer from a lack of attention to philosophy of science and, in particular, to the influential account of 
mechanistic explanation​ detailed by contemporary philosophers of neuroscience.  
 
An account of how cognitive neuroscience proceeds, and of its aims, norms and explanatory practices has been a 
key subject of debate in recent philosophy of science.  In the last twenty years, philosophical accounts of 
scientific explanation have taken  a ‘‘mechanistic turn’’ (Kästner 2017). Replacing previous 
deductive-nomological (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948) and unificationist accounts (Kitcher 1989) which proved 
to be unequipped to deal with the explanatory practices emerging in the special sciences, the now received 
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account of neuroscientific explanation is that proposed by the ​New Mechansits . According to this view, 43
neuroscientific explanation works by uniformly accounting for higher level cognitive phenomena, diverse 
behaviours such as memory, language and action, via the identification and detailed description of the​ neural 
mechanism​ which brings it about and, in doing so, situating such cognitive phenomena within the ​causal 
structure ​of the world. The standard new mechanist form of explanation is illustrated in the following diagram: 
 
Figure 1​ Mechanistic Explanation (adapted from Craver 2007;7) 
 
In figure 1 the cognitive phenomena to be explained is represented by  ‘S’s ψ-ing’, where S refers to the 
mechanism as a whole, and ψ the property or behaviour to be explained . According to the mechanistic account 44
of explanation, this is explained by the temporal and spatial organisation of the activities of component entities 
(Xs’ ϕ-ings) which make up the mechanism (Craver 2007;5-7). In the diagram, the X’s represent the component 
entities of the mechanism, the ϕ’s the activities which they perform and the arrows denote the causal activity 
between the acting component entities in the mechanism. In mechanistic explanation, the relationship between 
the explanandum (the higher level cognitive phenomenon) and the explanans (the neural mechanism) is said to 
43 New Mechanists include Machamer Darden & Craver (2000) Bechtel (2005, 2007), Darden (2008), Glennan (2005, 
2017) Machamer ( 2004), Woodward (2002), Ilari & Williamson (2012). I concern myself  here with the most influential 
account of mechanistic explanation put forward by Carl Craver (2005, 2007, 2013). 
44 Recent debate concerns the ontological nature of constitutive mechanistic phenomena. See Kaiser & Krickel (2016) for 
an overview and convincing argument for the claim that these are best understood as ​object-involving occurents​.  
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be one of ​constitution​ (indicated by the black dotted lines in figure 1). That is, the acting entities which 
constitute the mechanism (Xs’ ϕ-ings) are spatially and temporally ​contained within​ the phenomenon (S’s ψ-ing) 
. Indicated by the way in which phenomena are often said to be explained by their ‘underlying mechanism’ 
which ‘exhibit’ or are responsible for them, this form of explanation in cognitive neuroscience is known as 
constitutive mechanistic explanation​.  
 
According to this account of explanation, cognitive mechanistic phenomena are constitutively explained by 
their being situated within a hierarchy of ​levels​ or ‘nested mechanisms’, defined locally in terms of the 
component acting entities of a given mechanism (represented by red lines in figure 1). That is, once the 
component acting entities of the mechanism for a given phenomenon have been identified, these can then in 
turn be explained via the identification and description of ​their ​underlying mechanism, by the same method . 45
Craver puts forward the following criterion for the individuation of mechanistic levels: ‘‘X’s ’ ϕ-ing is at a lower 
mechanistic level than S’s  ψ-ing if and only if X’s  ϕ-ing is a ​component​ of the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing’’ (189). 
How is it that components (Xs’ ϕ-ings) of a given mechanism for S are determined? Craver outlines two 
conditions for the constitutive relevance of component entities of mechanisms(153-157): (i) spatiotemporal 
parthood; X must be a spatiotemporal part of the system whose behaviour is to be explained (Krickel 2017). 
And (ii) Xs’ ϕ-ings and S’s ψ-ing must be ​mutually manipulable​ viz. A  part is constitutively relevant 
component  in a mechanism if one can change the behavior of the mechanism as a whole by intervening to 
change the behavior of the component ​and​ one can change the behavior of the component by intervening to 
change the behavior of the mechanism as a whole .  46
 
A number of philosophers have recently argued this prevalent form of mechanistic explanation just outlined 
places interpretational demands on a characterisation of the NCC programme, demanding its 
recharacterisation. In his paper ‘The Neural Correlates of Consciousness Reconsidered’ (2012) Joseph Neisser 
argues that any discussion of the NCC programme ought to reflect this prevalent account of neuroscientific 
explanation . Motivated again by the idea that contemporary discussions of the NCC programme suffers from 47
a lack of input from recent philosophy of science, Neisser's’ objection stems from what he sees an implicit 
45 ​The standard example of this is that of spatial memory, illustrated in a rat’s navigation of the Morris Water Maze (Krickel 
2017;3, Craver 2007; 165-70).  
46 ​The viability of the ​mutual manipulability criterion​, characterised in terms of Woodwardian interventions (153), has 
been the topic of recent debate (Leuridan 2012, Baumgartner & Gebharter 2016, Romero 2015). The worry here is that 
there is a tension or inconsistency in Craver’s account insofar as interventionism is an account of​ causation​. See Romero 
(2015) Baumgartner & Gebharter ( 2016) and Krickel (​forthcoming​) for ways of resolving this inconsistency and retaining 
the constitution relation along mutual manipulability lines. It is this ambiguity between constitutive and causal relations 
which ultimately leads Neisser (below) to his causal characterisation of the NCC. I return to this in chapter 4. 
47 See also Revonsuo (2000), Vernazzani (2015), Seth (2009). For ease of exposition, I focus of Neisser’s argument here. 
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commitment in Chalmers’ writing to an outdated form of scientific explanation viz. an account which takes the 
crucial explanatory aim of neuroscience to be the discovery of laws from which deductive arguments can be 
constructed . According to Neisser, once the mechanistic explanatory aims and practice of neuroscience are 48
taken into account, the NCC programme ought to be understood as working towards an ​explanation​ ​of 
consciousness ​ (which applies to both content and state approaches) via the description and identification of the 
multi-levelled neural mechanisms ​responsible for its production. 
 
That is, whilst the correlational interpretation looks to be correct on Chalmers’ description of the the science of 
consciousness - on which neuroscience ought to aim at formulation of a number of fundamental law-like 
principles - it does not make sense on, or follow from, a ​mechanistic account​ of neuroscientific explanation. On 
what Neisser calls a ‘causal mechanical’ interpretation of the NCC, researchers are not identifying a set of 
correlational facts which connect first and third person data - that is, correlations between neural activations 
and conscious content - but instead are, as above, best understood as localising the working parts of an 
underlying multi-level ​causal mechanism​ which exhibits consciousness. Neisser concludes with the following 
revised definition of a content NCC: 
 
‘‘An NCC can be defined as a minimal neural system N such that states of N are underlying ​causes ​of a 
measurable change in consciousness, where a given state of N, as the causally relevant component of an 
embodied mechanism, is a mutually manipulable INUS condition for the specified aspect of the conscious 
state’’ (2012, 689). 
 
Neisser supports this conclusion via a case study examination of binocular rivalry paradigms commonly found 
in the content NCC approach. According to Neisser,  attention to the details of this experimental paradigm 
supports his causal characterisation insofar as the neuroscientists working within this paradigm are identifying 
the neural activations which​ make the difference​, in the Woodwardian causal interventionist sense utilised by the 
new mechanists, to the experience of the preferred stimulus under examination in the study (683,686). That is, 
Neisser claims, not only is the mechanistic interpretation of the NCC ​theoretically plausible​ given the 
48 While he does not discuss this explicitly, what Neisser seems to have in mind - and what seems plausible given Chalmers 
prescriptive account of the science of consciousness above - is that Chalmers’ is committed to the traditional Covering-Law 
model of explanation (Hempel, 1965) according to which scientific explanations are arguments from premises describing 
the laws of nature (Chalmers’ fundamental principles) and antecedent conditions to a conclusion describing the 
explanandum. The covering-law model faces a number of standard objections, and is now widely believed to be inadequate 
(See Craver (2007, chp2 S.4 for a summary of these objections). 
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prevalence of mechanistic explanation in neuroscience, it is also supported by the actual experimental practices 
of researchers searching for the neural correlates of consciousness . 49
 
According to Neisser then, premise one of the neutrality argument is false as neuroscience, qua the neural 
correlates of consciousness research programme, is best understood as searching for a set of diachronic ​causal 
facts relating third and first person relata. If correct, this has serious ramifications for the proponent of the 
neutrality argument. Not only does it render the current argument unsound, but it also casts serious doubt on 
the prospects for constructing an argument in support of the neutrality assumption which takes this causal 
characterisation as a starting point. Causal relations, unlike correlational relations, come with metaphysical 
implications and commitments. To take one example, causal relations are generally thought to be ​irreflexive​ viz. 
requiring the existence of distinct causal relata . If Neisser is correct then that mechanistic explanation demands 50
a causal characterisation of the NCC, this would - following standard accounts of such positions - appear to rule 
out a variety of physicalist (constitutive or identity) accounts of the relation between the NCC and conscious 
experience and conversely, support prima facie a sort of ​dualist position​ (if Kriegel's causal characterisation of 
dualism is correct).   
 
Whilst I agree with the broad motivation for Neisser’s argument that the correct characterisation of the NCC 
programme ought to plausibly reflect the dominant forms of explanation in neuroscience (assuming that 
experimental practices support and don’t point against this), I am not so sure that this demands a causal - as 
opposed to constitutive - interpretation. I return to this issue in the final chapter. For the purposes of my 
argument here however,  it is enough that a mechanistic interpretation of the NCC - irrespective of whether it is 
best interpreted in terms of diachronic causal or synchronic constitutive facts - provides us with a 
characterisation of the facts uncovered by the NCC programme which are (a) ​non-correlational​ (thus falsifying 
the first premise of the neutrality argument) and perhaps more importantly (b) ​not metaphysically innocent. 
While only (a) is needed to refute the argument detailed in section 2, (b) is crucial; suggesting that the prospects 
of constructing an argument to justify the methodological independence exhibited by contemporary debate is 
slim. Can this line of argument be resisted? In the third and fourth chapters, I offer a more comprehensive case 
in favour of this claim. For now, however, I’ll raise another objection against premise one of the neutrality 
49 ​Talk and discussion of the non-correlational neural mechanisms ‘underlying’ ‘responsible’ or ‘generating’ consciousness 
within the NCCs programme and beyond which support this claim are rife. See, for example, Anil Seth’s  ‘Explanatory 
Correlates of Consciousness’ (2009). In chapter 4 I return to, and give a more detailed case in support of this mechanistic 
interpretation of the NCC, and its experimental support, in the context of the more recent ‘no-report based’ experimental 
paradigms used in NCC work and constitutive mechanistic explanation. 
50Psillos (2008). 
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argument which aims to demonstrate that it is ​incomplete​. This applies even if the mechanistic interpretation of 
the NCC programme just outlined can be resisted. 
 
2 2 Is the NCC Exhaustive of Neuroscientific Work on Consciousness? 
 
In order for the neutrality argument to succeed in establishing a neutrality assumption which is ​robust ​- that is, 
applying to​ all ​neuroscientific work on consciousness - and thus justifying the robust methodological 
independence outlined in the introduction, it needs to be the case that the neural correlates of consciousness 
research programme is not only paradigmatic of, but​ exhausts​ contemporary empirical work on consciousness. 
That is, if there is prominent work on phenomenal consciousness which (i) falls outside of the NCC 
programme and (ii) can not be characterised in terms of the search for metaphysically innocent correlational 
facts, then premise 1 of the neutrality argument provided by Chalmers and Kriegel is false. Here, I will argue 
that there is at least one influential body of work in contemporary neuroscience which meets these two 
conditions. This is Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Oizumi et al. 2014, Tononi & Koch 2015, 
Tononi et. al 2016). After providing a brief outline of the theory,  I’ll identify what I take to be its central - 
non-correlational - ontological commitments. 
  
One the leading and most influential neuroscientific theories of consciousness, IIT is motivated by the explicit 
aim to ‘address the hard problem of consciousness in a new way’ (Tononi et al. 2016;450). It purports to do so 
via adoption of a novel top-down or ‘axiomatic approach’. Starting with the identification of a number of 
‘self-evident’ claims about the essential nature of conscious experience - the so-called ​phenomenological axioms​ - 
proponents of IIT attempt to construct a neuroscientific theory of the physical basis of conscious experience by 
deriving from these self evident claims, a number of ​physical postulates​ which explain how these aspects of our 
conscious experience could be realised through a physical system like the brain. The theory has gone through 
several modifications , however in its most recent formulation (references above) IIT makes use of five such 51
phenomenological axioms: (i) intrinsic existence (consciousness exists from its own ‘intrinsic perspective’ 
independent of external observers) (ii) composition (experience is structured in the familiar sense of allowing for 
various phenomenal distinctions - spatial, visual and otherwise) (iii) information (conscious experience is 
specific​) (iv) integration (experience is unitary) and (v) exclusion (consciousness has determinate contents) . 52
The physical postulates - which again, attempt to explain how these axioms are brought about in the brain - are 
numerous,  however, each is thought to follow ​a priori​  via deductive inference from the self evident 
51 Tononi (2004), Tononi (2008), Ozumi et al. (2014). 
52 C.f. Cerullo (2015). 
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phenomenological claims, a methodology which purportedly  gives IIT its epistemic credentials . These five 53
axioms and their physical postulates lead proponents of IIT to their central claim: that conscious experience​ is 
maximum integrated information​ in a system (𝚽). That is, according to proponents of IIT that the quantity of 
consciousness present in a system is identical to the amount of information generated by a complex of elements 
above and beyond the information generated by its parts .  54
 
In his recent critique of IIT, Tim Bayne (forthcoming) sets out the theory’s explanatory aims and ambitions, 
which he takes to be threefold (i) being a theory of subjective experience (ii) being a ​reductive theory​ with 
ontological and epistemic commitments and (iii) being comprehensive, applying to each and every instance of 
conscious experience . For my purposes in assessing the first premise of the neutrality argument, the first two 55
commitments of IIT are crucial. First, IIT is explicitly a theory of phenomenal consciousness. This is important. 
While there may be other prominent neuroscientific work on consciousness which resists correlational analysis - 
such as Dehane’s Global Workspace Theory - this frequently falls foul of the objection that it fails to account 
for or explain the phenomenal, as opposed to mere access, aspects of consciousness Block (2009)​.​In contrast, 
IIT amounts to prominent neuroscientific work on phenomenal consciousness, which also falls outside of the 
NCC programme, and in doing so, meets the first condition outlined above. Second, IIT is an account of the 
fundamental nature of consciousness and comes with specific metaphysical commitments. That is its 
proponents are not claiming that conscious experience is merely ​correlated ​with maximum 𝚽 but rather, the 
more significant claim that consciousness is to ​be identified​ with a given quantity of 𝚽 in a system. While the 
specific metaphysical commitments of IIT - either physicalist or not - are currently in dispute, all that is required 
53 To take (ii) composition as one example (see also Mindt 2017; Tononi and Koch 2015). Here, the purported self-evident 
claim that experience is essentially compositionally structured (within my visual field I can for e.g. currently distinguish 
between my[laptop] sitting on the [desk] [in front] of me, the [red] [coffee cup] to the [side] etc. - creating a composition 
of phenomenal distinctions) demands that the physical system instantiating this aspect of phenomenology must itself be 
structured, where this is defined as  ‘subsets of elements (composed in various combinations) must have cause-effect power 
on the system’ (Tononi & Koch 2015;7) An informative summary of the physical postulates of IIT can be found in 
Tononi et al (2016; 450-452). The move from axioms to postulates in each case can and has, along with the self evident 
nature of these phenomenological claims been questioned (see Switzgabel 2015; Bayne forthcoming;). Given that my aim 
here is draw out the ontological commitments of IIT​, if successful​, I don’t discuss these here.   
54Or more precisely, that every given conscious experience is identical to a ​conceptual structure - ​ the set of cause-effect 
repertoires specified by a neural mechanism with maximum 𝚽 (2016; 452). Defined as such, this identity claim provides an 
explanation of conscious content - which is said to correspond to the ​form ​of this structure - in addition to conscious level 
(which corresponds to its maximum 𝚽). The credibility of IIT as a theory of consciousness has come as a result of its 
explanatory and predictive power (c.f. Pautz ​in draft​). The theory’s central claim has since been tested, for example, at the 
level of individual subjects - ranging from healthy awake volunteers to brain damaged patients, using the Perturbational 
Complexity Index (PCI), which acts as a proxy for an empirical measure of integrated information in a system (2016;459, 
2018;chp5). However development of further empirical methods for testing IIT’s predictions is currently underway (Boly 
et al. 2015, and the ​forthcoming​ Entropy: Special Issue 2018). 
55 ‘​‘for if- as its advocates claim - consciousness ​just is​ integrated information, then any system with integrated information 
must be conscious and any conscious system must exhibit integrated information’’ (2).  
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here is the following: that IIT amounts to an ​ontological,​ as opposed to correlational, neuroscientific thesis 
about the nature of phenomenal consciousness.  In sum, insofar as IIT meets both conditions introduced 
above, the first premise of the neutrality argument is false: neuroscience as it pertains to the study of 
consciousness is not currently limited to the discovery of correlational facts as stipulated by the proponents of 
the neutrality argument. The neutrality argument is unsound. 
 
Does this claim reflect ontological commitments internal to the theory itself, or just the somewhat naive 
metaphysical claims of its leading proponents? If this latter analysis is correct, an objection to the claim just 
made might be posed as follows viz. That we can grant the claim that IIT’s ​proponents ​take their theory to have 
certain non-correlational ontological implications, but argue that, metaphysically speaking, it is open to the 
metaphysician of mind to view IIT’s central claim relating phenomenal consciousness to 𝚽 as ​leaving open​, in 
much the same way as the correlational facts produced by the NCC programme, which precise dependency 
relation - identity, realisation, nomological or metaphysical supervenience etc. - the central relational claim of 
IIT is indicative of . If viable, this line of argument would raise problems for my second objection, insofar as it 
suggests that IIT’s central claim is in fact correlational and thus, fails to falsify premise one of the neutrality 
argument . However, this line of objection seems to be unpropitious for two broad reasons. First, a number of 56
recent ​philosophical​ treatments of IIT suggest that the theory ​does​ commit its proponents to specific ontological 
positions and as such, cannot be read or interpreted correlationally in the manner just described.  For example, it 
has been argued both that the current notion of information IIT utilises commits the theory to a physicalist 
metaphysics (Mindt 2017) and that, as it currently stands, the theory is currently incompatible with standard 
forms of Russellian panpsychism (Morch 2018) . While the specifics of the ontological implications of IIT may 57
be disputable, the claim that these recent treatments suggest - namely, that IIT ​has​ such constraining ontological 
commitments (and that these look initially to support a physicalist metaphysical thesis) - is sufficient to rule out 
the correlational objection to my argument above, and support the falsity of premise one of the neutrality 
argument. More broadly, the problem with this correlational objection to my argument is that in this context, 
the claim that IIT provides at best mere correlations seems to primarily stipulative, and reflects what I see as a 
wider failure in metaphysical discussions of consciousness to accept and take seriously the ​explanatory​ aims and 
56See Chalmers’ (2016), for the claim that we can view IIT as asserting an ​a posteriori law of combination ​as opposed to 
identity. 
57 ​Morch subsequently argues nonetheless that IIT as a theory should be subsequently revised to render the two 
compatible. Note however, that this latter sort of argument should not be attractive to the neutrality shipper, 
who requires that ​current​ neuroscientific theories, as opposed to those substantially revised - for possible ad hoc 
purposes - are compatible with the relevant competing metaphysical frameworks.  
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commitments at the heart of contemporary neuroscientific practice. I take up  this claim below and in the 
following chapter. 
 
 3 Taking Stock 
 
In this chapter I have argued that the prevalent assumption in recent metaphysics of consciousness that 
neuroscientific work is ​metaphysically neutral or unilluminating,​ which justifies metaphysicians working in 
methodological independence from neuroscientific work on consciousness, can be traced back to a single line of 
argument proposed by David Chalmers and more recently by Uriah Kriegel, which starts from a claim 
concerning the types of facts pursued by the neural correlates of consciousness research programme. I have 
argued that this ‘neutrality argument’ faces two serious objections: (i) that we have good reason to think that the 
correlational analysis of the NCC programme that this argument relies upon is mistaken and (ii) that, even so, 
the correlational work pursued by the NCC is no longer exhaustive of research in the field. These give us reason 
to think not only that the argument in its current formulation​ fails to establish​ the neutrality assumption, but 
also - given the strict ontological implications these objections suggest - that it is unlikely that a new neutrality 
argument can be reconstructed along similar lines.  
 
What does the failure of the neutrality argument, as argued for here, mean for future methodological 
approaches to the metaphysics of consciousness? The proper conclusion of this chapter - and the claim I take 
myself to have argued for so far - is that the neutrality argument fails to establish the neutrality assumption, and 
as such - insofar there is no other readily available case in support of it - the robust methodological 
independence practiced in current debate, as outlined in the introductory chapter, lacks adequate justification. 
This should, I think, motivate us to consider and take seriously methodological alternatives to robust 
independence. I take this task up in the following chapters. Before doing so however, it is important to set out 
and summarise the main issue that lies behind much of the discussion in this chapter, so that the next step in the 
search for alternative methodological approaches (and the desiderata on such)  is clear. Whilst the two 
objections presented here are distinct, they are both, I think, indicative of a related and larger problem which has 
rendered these previous arguments from Chalmers and Kriegel inadequate. This is that previous discussions 
have failed, to their detriment, to pay attention to the ​specific theoretical and metaphysical commitments​ of 
contemporary neuroscience. This is evidenced both in the correlational reading of the NCC programme which 
these arguments rely upon ( which, as I and others have suggested, runs contrary to the prevalent form of 
explanation in neuroscience) along with the failure to take the more recent theoretical frameworks in 
consciousness science like IIT, along with their ontological implications, into serious consideration.  
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In order to establish the sort of metaphysical neutrality sufficient to justify robust methodological 
independence, it needs to be the case that the considerable work produced as part of the neuroscience of 
consciousness is devoid of ontologically constraining commitments. Another way of stating the main claims of 
this chapter (and the thesis which I examine further in the following chapters) is that, whilst this may have 
appeared plausible twenty years ago, recent work in the neuroscience of consciousness, along with parallel 

























‘‘There are places where sophisticated scientific theses will cut directly against metaphysical ones, especially if the scientific 
thesis in question fits with established theory or enjoys indirect empirical support. Here there is danger for the scientifically 
näıve metaphysician, and metaphysically informed work in general philosophy of science plays an important role in the 





In the conclusion of the previous chapter I argued that Chalmers’ and Kriegel’s neutrality argument failed to 
establish the neutrality assumption, and by extension, failed to provide justification for the methodological 
independence of the metaphysics of consciousness from the recent empirical work on its neural basis. I argued 
that this ought to motivate us to consider alternative methodological approaches to the metaphysics of mind, 
and furthermore, that this alternative approach should aim to accommodate - as a central desideratum - the sorts 
of theoretical and metaphysical commitments internal to neuroscientific practice which the arguments 
discussed in the previous chapter were suggestive of. In this third chapter, I present one such alternative 
approach. First however, I want to step back and provide this approach with a sound methodological basis. This 
takes as its starting point the recognition that the question at the heart of this thesis - namely, that of the correct 
account of the relationship between the metaphysics and neuroscience of consciousness - is an instance of the 
significantly broader​ meta-metaphysical​ question of the relationship between metaphysics and science more 
generally.  This latter question has been the topic of heated debate in metaphysics over the past twenty years 
since Chalmers first put forward the neutrality argument. The starting point in my search and motivation of 
alternative approaches is thus the claim that, given its relationship to this broader question, the relationship 
between the metaphysics and neuroscience of consciousness ought to be sensitive to and illuminated by the key 
developments and argumentative insights within this field.  
 
The plan for the chapter is as follows. In sections 1 and 2 I introduce and detail two developments from recent 
meta-metaphysics. These are (i) the emergence of a growing research project that attempts to detail and unpack 
the ontological and commitments of  neuroscience and its explanatory practices and (ii) the prominent 
methodological defense of traditional metaphysics in response to the more radical discontinuation arguments in 
recent scientific metaphysics which claims that theory choice in metaphysics, as in some areas of theoretical 
science, proceeds via ​inference to the best explanation​. In section 3 I combine and use these dialectical 
developments to construct a case in favour of a novel methodological approach to debates over consciousness’ 
ontological status. This takes as central the claim that an approach to the metaphysics of mind which takes as its 
starting point the metaphysical commitments of neuroscience is not only an interesting potential alternative to 
methodological independence, but follows from reflection on the minimal ​demand ​that candidate ontological 
accounts of consciousness be ​empirically equivalent​. In section 4, I outline the alternative​ ‘​Neuroscience-First’ 
Approach to the metaphysics of consciousness which this argument suggests. I conclude by briefly discussing 
how this approach can be situated with respect to the aforementioned debates concerning so-called naturalised 
metaphysics.  
 
1 The Metaphysics Of  Neuroscience  
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A key theme in contemporary meta-metaphysics - the branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature and 
methodology of metaphysical inquiry - concerns the relationship between metaphysics and science. This debate 
is not new, having begun in earnest in Quine’s arguments with the logical positivists in the 1940s, however it has 
had a contemporary resurgence in the programme of so-called  ‘‘naturalised’ or ‘‘scientific metaphysics’’. Here, 
the primary aim is to develop an account of metaphysical inquiry, and in most cases a resulting ontology, which 
is properly grounded in contemporary science. As stated on the website for the Society of the Metaphysics of 
science, the metaphysics of science programme takes as its broad remit  ‘‘the abstract examination of ontological 
issues as they arise within, or grow out of, the sciences and their findings, concepts models or theories’’ .  58
 
This broad mandate has subsequently given rise to two distinct research programmes (Guay and Pradeau, 
2017), the first of which attempts to utilise and apply recent empirical findings to augment areas of traditional 
metaphysical interest. This line of work, which tends to include contemporary debates over causality, laws and 
individuality (along with others) contrasts with the second programme - ‘scientific metaphysics’ - which starts 
from the claim that metaphysical inquiry is epistemically valuable ​only insofar as it is grounded in​ scientific 
observation and theorising and, as such, aims to construct an ontology based exclusively in contemporary 
(typically fundamental) science . Within this latter, and arguably more prominent programme, the 59
contemporary dialectic tends to proceed via by the construction of consecutive negative and positive arguments. 
Here, metaphysicians of science start by presenting a negative case a against traditional ‘neo-scholastic’ varieties 
of metaphysics  - where the critical focus is typically on highlighting the various ​epistemic inadequacies​ of its a 
priori methods (such as its heavy reliance on intuitions, and minimal engagement with superficial 
characterisations of contemporary science) - which are subsequently used to motivate the construction of 
alternative ​naturalised ​metaphysical research programmes which, proponents claim, ought to serve as a 
replacement for traditional metaphysics.  
 
Both the nature of the negative charges against traditional styles of metaphysics, and the extent to which these 
traditional programmes require replacement or discontinuation are matters of ongoing dispute in contemporary 
debate .  My primary concern here however is to highlight a broad development which has occured as a result 60
58https://sites.google.com/site/socmetsci/what-is-the-metaphysics-of-science-1​.  
59For examples of the former line of research, which I do not discuss further here, see Ellis (2001), Bird (2007), Lowe 
(2006), Chakravartty (2007) and Mumford and Tugby (2013). For scientific metaphysics, see Ladyman and Ross (2007), 
Maudlin (2007); Ross et al. (2013), Ney (2012), Wilson (2006) and Maddy (2007). Informative overviews of the field as a 
whole can be found in Tahko (2015;chp9) and Soto (2015) along with the essays included in Ross et al (2013).  
60For recent discussion of the purported epistemics sins of neo-scholastic metaphysics see Bryant (2017), Chakravartty 
(2013) along with French and McKenzie (2011). The nature of the metaphysical project which ought to replace traditional 
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of the growing interest in the programme of scientific metaphysics, broadly understood, and adherence to the 
wide research mandate highlighted in the quote above. This is the extension of the research programme, which 
(given the overlap in subject matter) in its initial formulations tended to focus on issues within fundamental 
physics, to the ​life sciences​, and in particular, its recent manifestation in a growing body of work concerned with 
the metaphysical issues arising within neuroscience and neuroscientific explanation. That is, as result of the 
success of recent work in scientific metaphysics, a number of philosophers have sought to construct a richer and 
more inclusive programme of scientific metaphysics which, in addition to the traditional projects in the 
philosophy and metaphysics of physics, is expanded to include metaphysically oriented work in the philosophy 
of biology, psychology and neuroscience . Conducted for the most part by the New Mechanists - the 61
philosophers of science whose work I introduced in the previous chapter - the focus thus far in the metaphysics 
of neuroscience has primarily been on the development of a detailed account of the ​metaphysics of mechanistic 
explanation​. That is, the aim of this recent work has been to provide of an account of the various ontological 
commitments which fall out of the detailed, descriptively adequate account of neuroscientific explanation 
detailed by contemporary philosophy of neuroscience, and the application of these to relevant debates in the 
philosophy of mind and philosophy of science . Recall the account of explanation discussed in the previous 62
chapter, depicted in the figure below: 
 
styles of metaphysics - that is, the extent to which metaphysics requires ​naturalisation​ - is heavily disputed among scientific 
metaphysicians. Here, proposals range from the more radical viz. that metaphysics must be based solely on, and motivated 
by the sole purpose of serving or unifying, current science (Ladyman and Ross 2007, Ney 2012), to the more moderate. 
According to these more recent suggestions (Tahko and Morganti; 2017 Guay & Pradeu; 2017) whilst epistemic 
considerations demand that metaphysicians ​must​ engage consistently with contemporary science to a great degree, 
metaphysics can nevertheless retain its status as an autonomous discipline with a broad set of distinctive theoretical aims. 
This is defended either on the basis that metaphysics has a distinctive subject matter (see below) or that metaphysicians 
utilise a unique methodology (Tahko and Morganti 2017).  
61For an explicit defense of a more inclusive metaphysics of science extended to the special sciences see Guay & Pradeu 
(2017), however all recent proposals for ‘moderate’ programmes of naturalised metaphysics include this suggestion. 
62Descriptive adequacy here refers to accounts of explanation in neuroscience which is properly constrained by how 




Work in this emerging field is extensive, however prominent questions and issues discussed thus far include (i), 
the proper account of the​ metaphysical​ ​constitution​ of the mechanistic explanans - namely, what, metaphysically 
speaking, mechanisms are,​ ​and which ontological categories are best used to describe them and their component 
parts, (ii), an account of the ontological status of the​ phenomena ​which serves as the explanandum of 
mechanistic explanation - viz. what is the ontological nature of constitutive mechanistic phenomena, and as 
such, are they multiply realisable? (iii), what is the nature and relata of the mechanistic ​level relation ​(the dotted 
red lines) - and what does this mean for more traditional debates regarding​ ontological reduction, ​emergence and 
interdisciplinary unity in the special sciences? Finally, and most prominently, much of current discussion has 
concerned an issue which was touched on in the previous chapter, namely (iv) the correct account of the 
metaphysical ​relationship​ (the dotted black lines) which obtains between the mechanism and phenomenon to 
be explained in constitutive mechanistic explanation . 63
63Craver & Tabery (2017;S4), Glennan (2017; particularly chapters 6&7, and 2009), Krickel (2017, 2018), Baumgartner et 
al. (2018), Kaiser & Krickel (2016), Kastner (2017; Chps 7 & 11), Soom (2012), Harbecke (2010, 2014), Krickel (2014), 
Kaiser and Craver (2013), Craver (2007;chp5), Erononen (2013, 2015) and Gillet (2013). This metaphysical project seems 
prima facie to require that mechanistic explanation in neuroscience is fully, or at least partly ​ontic, ​as opposed to purely 
epistemic, in nature - that is, that mechanistic explanations are objective features of the world (Craver 2007;27, 2014, 
Salmon 1984,  Illari 2013). This has not gone uncontested (see, for example, Glennan 2005, Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005 
Wright 2012, 2015), and the relationship between these alternative epistemic accounts of mechanistic explanation and the 
metaphysics of neuroscience deserves further consideration. Here and in the rest of thesis, however, I assume the validity of 
a (at least partly) ontic account of mechanistic explanation. 
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The details of the metaphysical picture of neuroscientific explanation which is emerging as a result of these 
discussions will be important later. For now, the purpose of my introducing this work, and the crucial claims I 
wish to make clear going forward, are threefold. First, that this emerging work heavily suggests that such a 
metaphysical picture of neuroscience ​exists​. This adds further weight to the claim that a metaphysically 
‘vacuous’ view of neuroscience and of neuroscientific practice discussed in the previous chapter is likely to be 
incorrect .  Second, that whilst this work on the metaphysics of neuroscience has emerged as a​ consequence​ and 64
development of the metaphysics of science programme, its uptake is not parasitic on acceptance of the 
discontinuation thesis at the heart of much of recent scientific metaphysics. That is just to say, one can - if one 
rejects radical formulations of scientific metaphysics - take the research programme just outlined in the 
metaphysics of neuroscience to be both important and ontologically illuminating without endorsing the further 
claim that all of metaphysics should be reduced, or limited to, this and similar projects. Finally, it is important to 
note that the ontological commitments of neuroscience emerging from this branch of the metaphysics of 
science are the products neither of uncareful metaphysical speculation from those unfamiliar with metaphysics - 
as, it could be argued, is the case for the claims made by neuroscientists working on consciousness discussed in 
the last chapter -  nor of detailed philosophical or metaphysical examination which floats free and is 
independent from the demands of actual scientific theorising. This latter point is crucial, and follows as result of 
the aforementioned commitment of the New Mechanists to the production of an account of scientific 
explanation which is ​descriptively adequate;​ that is, constrained and motivated by actual, as opposed to idealised, 
experimental practices used in neuroscience to successfully explain phenomena of scientific interest (Craver 
2007;21, Kaiser and Krickel 2016;). This careful balance struck in the emerging work on the metaphysics of 
neuroscience between the cautious unpacking of the metaphysical structure of mechanistic explanations on one 
hand, and actual experimental practices on the other, gives us reason to take the emerging metaphysical picture 
very seriously; as that which is entailed by any serious theoretical acceptance of neuroscience, broadly 




The first development in metametaphysics which I take to be of direct relevance to the search for alternatives to 
methodological independence in the metaphysics of mind then is the recent work in the metaphysics of 
neuroscience. The second development I take to be crucial to making progress on this issue comes from a 
64That is, this supports the view that the claim discussed in the Chapter 2 conclusion - that neuroscientific theories and 
practices entail specific ontological commitments - is not a unique feature of the neuroscience of consciousness, nor the 
naive claims made by its practitioners, but rather emerges as a plausible and​ expected ​consequence of recent philosophy and 
metaphysics of science. 
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different dialectical direction. Emerging in response to the more radical lines of arguments in recent scientific 
metaphysics just mentioned, which call the discontinuation and replacement of non-naturalised contemporary 
metaphysics - on the basis that its methodology, unlike that of science, is inadequate for the purposes of 
objective inquiry - philosophers have looked to defend traditional styles of metaphysics by providing an analysis 
on which metaphysics and science are broadly methodologically continuous. That is, according to proponents 
of ​methodological naturalism​, theory choice in metaphysics proceeds in a broadly similar manner as theory 
choice in certain areas of  highly theoretical science . In both cases, proponents of methodological naturalism 65
claim, the methods used to develop and subsequently select theories are the same.  
 
The (much over simplified) story is as follows. First, a posteriori reasoning is used in the usual manner to 
develop competing theories of the world which fit the available observational data. Second, theory choice 
between these competing underdetermined alternatives is subsequently made on theoretical or a priori grounds, 
via an ​inference to the best explanation ​(IBE) (Paul 2012). That is, in the rare cases in which competing scientific 
theories are underdetermined by the empirical evidence, it is claimed that theory choice is subsequently 
warranted on the basis of an assessment of a theory’s overall ​explanatory power;  ​where this is understood in 
terms of a given theory’s degree or maximisation of the evidential so-called ‘super empirical’ or theoretical 
virtues, including parsimony, plausibility, fecundity, internal consistency, universal coherence, and so on. The 
choice between Einstien’s special relativity and Lorentz-type ether theories is typically offered as a case in point66
. 
 
65See Papineau (2015) for a discussion of methodological naturalism in a broader context, as distinct but related to 
naturalism understood as an ontological thesis. It is also important to distinguish the methodological naturalists’ thesis 
from the physicalist ​attitude​ or stance one adopts when forming an ontology centered or based solely on current physics 
(Ney 2008, Van Fraassen 2002). Whilst acceptance of methodological naturalism may be necessary for endorsing so-called 
attitudinal varieties of physicalism (although this is debatable), it is not sufficient. That is, one can take metaphysics and 
science to be methodologically continuous in the manner described below, without - as we shall see - endorsing the further 
claim that the ontology produced via such methods is, or even ought to be, exclusively based on and limited to the 
ontological posits of contemporary physics. 
66 Ladyman (2012), although examples from other fields can be found in ​Tulodziecki (2013),Werndl (2013) and Belot 
(2014).​This latter claim is usually expressed via the assertion that empirical equivalence is not exhaustive of the epistemic 
constraints on theory choice in science; that is, by the denial that the empirical adequacy of theories entails their ​epistemic 
equivalence, and as such, that theory choice in these cases is genuinely evidentially underdetermined. Here, the 
methodological naturalist enters into controversial ground. The epistemic or truth-conducive, as opposed to pragmatic, 
nature of the theoretical virtues employed in IBE has long been disputed in contemporary philosophy of science and, given 
its role in the the underdetermination argument against scientific realism, hotly debated (Van Fraassen 1980, Psillos 1999, 
Laudan and Leplin 1991, Tulodziecki 2012, Alai ​forthcoming​). I do not wish to get in to these arguments here and as such, 
grant the viability of an IBE approach conditionally for the purposes of my argument. (C.f Ladyman’s (2012) discussion of 
the relationship between this explanationist defense of metaphysics and the rise of scientific realism). 
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The methodological naturalists’ claim then, is that metaphysical theorising proceeds analogously to these cases. 
In metaphysics, it is claimed, coherent metaphysical theories of a given phenomenon or feature of the world are 
first constructed, and subsequently integrated with philosophical logic. Whilst these may lack direct testability 
which is paradigmatic of most scientific cases, they must, like the theories just mentioned, nevertheless account 
for all available observational data with respect to the phenomenon and its observed instances. Given that there 
will be many such theories which meet these criteria (viz. coherence, logical consistency and empirical fit) the 
problem of choosing which theory to accept is solved in the same manner - by conducting a ​cost benefit analysis 
of each theory, where the relevant costs and benefits are thought to mirror the kinds of theoretical virtues 
utilised in theory choice between underdetermined alternatives in theoretical science. 
 
Further discussion of this so-called ‘explanationist’ defense of metaphysics can be found in Chakraverty (2013), 
Nolan (2015) and Manley (2009) Ladyman (2012), however its main formulation, and that which has garnered 
most attention from its opponents, is L.A.Paul’s analysis (2012). Crucial to Paul’s particular explanationist 
defense of metaphysics is the claim that the shared a posteriori elements of scientific and metaphysical theorising 
are best understood in terms of ​modelling​ - where this is meant in the technical sense shared by proponents of 
the dominant semantic view of theories in contemporary philosophy of science, which equates theories with 
classes of models . Whilst this is an important and interesting part of Paul’s case for methodological naturalism 67
and metaphysics as IBE, as Paul herself notes, adoption of the semantic view of scientific theorising is not 
necessary for her broader argument (12), nor is it relevant to the main line of argument I put forward in this 
chapter (see S3.2) .  68
 
Methodological naturalism as outlined allows for a response to the discontinuation arguments against 
traditional metaphysics which goes as follows. The central negative claim made by scientific metaphysicians is 
that traditional neo-scholastic style metaphysics, in contrast to scientific theorising, is unsuited for the purposes 
of generating substantial conclusions about the nature of the world in virtue of its​ distinctive​ a priori 
methodology (which they claim is epistemically defective). If methodological naturalism is true however, and 
metaphysics is correctly analysed in terms of inference to the best explanation, then this central claim of the 
negative discontinuation arguments is false. If theory-choice on this basis is warranted in science and everyday 
reasoning - which its proponents, along with scientific realists (as explained above), presume - so too, the 
methodological naturalist claims, IBE must be warranted in metaphysics. That is to say, on this view 
67French & Ladyman (1999), Suppes (2002), Thomson-Jones (1997), Godfrey-Smith (2006). 
68As such, I remain neutral on the semantic/syntactic debate, and do incorporate Paul’s semantic account of metaphysical 
theorising into my discussion here. 
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metaphysics and science differ not - contra the claims of scientific metaphysicians - in the methodological 
practices they use to make claims about a subject of shared interest namely, the nature of objective reality, but 
rather, are best understood as engaging in and employing the same methodology with respect to​ different​ sorts 
of questions arising from the study of reality. As such, it is concluded, ‘‘those who argue that metaphysics uses a 
problematic methodology to make claims about the subjects better covered by natural science get the situation 
exactly the wrong way around’’ (L.A.Paul; 2012;1) .  69
 
The defense of metaphysics that an IBE or explanationist account of metaphysics allows for provides defenders 
of neo-scholastic metaphysics with strong reason to take this view seriously. Whether it is ultimately successful 
against the discontinuation arguments, however, remains to be seen, and will depend on the stances one takes 
on a number of further issues in the metaphysics and philosophy of science. Foremost, this will depend on the 
substantive issue of the legitimacy of IBE in science (and the outcome of related debates on the threat to 
scientific realism from underdetermination) mentioned above. Further, even if this is granted, the success of the 
explantionist defense of metaphysics just described will depend on whether one takes the rare cases of IBE and 
theory underdetermination in science to be analogous in the relevant respects so as to justify its widespread 
application in metaphysics. This latter claim viz. that the explantionist defense fails because the cases of theory 
underdetermination in science and metaphysics are ​disanalogous,​ is defended extensively in Ladyman (2012). 
Here, Ladyman argues that scientific theory underdetermination differs in a problematic sense from 
underdetermination cases in traditional metaphysics in two key respects, being both ‘local’ (domain or theory 
specific) and ‘weak’ (empirically equivalent in respect to​ current​, as opposed to all potential, observations) 
(42-44) . 70
 
 These issues deserve further consideration, however as before, it is not yet necessary to enter these broader 
debates concerning naturalised metaphysics. For now, my aim - beyond pointing out the primary dialectical 
motivation for methodological naturalism - is to reflect and make clear what this popular account of traditional 
metaphysics, ​if​ viable, commits us to with respect to the demands on metaphysical theories which are 
69In Paul’s view, metaphysical questions can generally be distinguished from those pursued by science on the basis of their 
generality and ontological priority (pp4-9). Thus, her claim that ‘‘metaphysics is concerned to identify the ​real ​nature of 
the world while science is concerned to discover the range of instances of these natures’’ (2012;5 emphasis added cf. Tahko 
& Morganti p12). I shall assume that an IBE analysis of metaphysics generally commits one to this ‘different subject matter’ 
claim, although I do not think that much hangs on this issue. 
70That is, to use the usual terminology, it is claimed that instances of theory underdetermination in science are always 
transitive as opposed to permanent in nature (Stanford 2006). I return to this claim in the context of metaphysical theories 
of consciousness briefly at the end of this chapter. 
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constructed on the basis of an IBE to engage with contemporary science. As explained above, the basic claims 
that the IBE or ‘explanationist’ defense of metaphysics makes are as follows. 
 
Metaphysical theorising proceeds via two consecutive steps: 
 
(1) The construction of coherent and logically consistent metaphysical theories (or models) of features of 
the world which fit the available data. ​(‘a posteriori step’)​. 
(2) Theory choice between competing empirically equivalent theories is made via the cost-benefit of the 
theoretical virtues that different theories exhibit. ​(‘a priori step’). 
 
With respect to direct scientific engagement then, the demands that an IBE defense places on metaphysical 
theories follows as a result of step (1), which is epistemically prior to (2). This is that an IBE analysis of 
metaphysics demands that candidate theories be ​empirically equivalent​, that is, be consistent with all the 
available observational data: 
 
Empirical Equivalence​: in order to secure epistemic warrant, candidate metaphysical theories (those 
subsequently subject to the cost benefit theoretical analysis in step (2)) - must be empirically equivalent.  
 
This requirement, which entails a sort of broad ​compatibility ​or consistency of metaphysical theories with 
contemporary science, is a minimal one. That is to say, the IBE analysis of metaphysics puts the bar for the 
scientific accountability of plausible metaphysical theories very low, and fails to place constraints on the 
formation of metaphysical theories which are robust and overly demanding . This is important. From a 71
dialectical perspective, if it can be demonstrated that contemporary metaphysical theories which plausibly 
demand analysis in IBE terms do not in fact satisfy this minimal condition, this will be bad news for the 
defender of contemporary metaphysics. If we have good reason to think that metaphysical theories constructed 
via IBE not only fail to satisfy the more stringent demands placed on them by contemporary accounts of 
naturalised metaphysics, but also the minimal demands revealed by their own defense via IBE, then we will have 
strong grounds to reject the epistemic credentials of such theories, and call for their replacement.  
 
3. Empirical Equivalence Revisited  
 




I began this chapter with the claim that the search for alternative, non-neutral conceptions of the relationship 
between the metaphysics and neuroscience of ​consciousness​, in virtue of the relationship between this question 
and the broader issue of the relationship between metaphysics and science, ought to be illuminated by 
examination of recent developments in meta-metaphysics. Situating this discussion in the context of the recent 
programme of scientific metaphysics, I explained how this programme has recently been extended to include 
work on the metaphysical underpinnings of neuroscience and neuroscientific explanation, and has subsequently 
thrown methodological naturalist accounts of metaphysics - as a response to the more radical interpretations of 
this programme - into greater prominence. How then can these two claims be used to make progress in 
providing an account of the proper relationship between the metaphysics and neuroscience of consciousness? A 
detailed examination of the metaphysics of mind in the context of naturalised metaphysics has not yet been 
undertaken. When it comes to the negative campaigns against neo-scholastic style metaphysics, debates have 
tended to target and focus on the viability of more traditional topics covered in metaphysics such as the 
contemporary debates over universals, persistence, and causation. The prospects of naturalising ‘applied’ 
debates, such as those in the metaphysics of mind, have so far been left unexamined. Given the primacy of these 
debates in contemporary scientific metaphysics, this philosophical task is urgently required. The first positive 
claim that I wish to put forward is thus an attempt to begin this discussion, whilst aiming to construct an 
alternative approach to neutrality and methodological independence. This is the claim that the metaphysics of 
mind is best understood as falling within the methodological naturalist framework just outlined. That is, that 
the metaphysics of mind as it is currently practiced proceeds via inference to the best explanation, from 
candidate ontological theories of consciousness which are purportedly empirically equivalent.  
 
I take this claim to have two broad motivations. The first should be obvious in light of the previous discussion. 
In addition to being both a prominent contemporary analysis of metaphysics independently of these debates, 
and seemingly implicit in many of the recent discussions of the metaphysics of mind mentioned in this thesis, an 
IBE account of the metaphysics of mind is motivated by the fact that it provides the metaphysician of mind 
with the resources to construct a case, a la Paul, against the discontinuation arguments at the heart of recent 
scientific metaphysics . This is far from trivial. In the absence of compelling arguments against these claims - 72
72 With respect to these earlier points, the IBE meta-metaphysical analysis of the metaphysics of consciousness is implicit in 
Balog’s (​forthcoming​) diagnosis of the ontological stalemate (and in particular, her argument concerning the lack of a 
posteriori ​and​ a priori means of breaking this dialectical deadlock;18) as well as featuring prominently in Kriegel’s 
(​forthcoming​) neutrality argument discussed at length in Chapter 2 (and his account of neutrality as empirically 
equivalency, more on this below). For discussion of the IBE analysis outside of the metaphysics of science see the discussion 
in Beebee (2018;3) - who, whilst not endorsing this meta-metaphysical position, nevertheless takes the IBE analysis to be 
the dominant or default position in contemporary meta-philosophy.  
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regarding which, I think it fair to say, there is no current consensus - these arguments have radical consequences 
for the future of metaphysics and its contemporary practice. Insofar as an IBE account of the meta-metaphysics 
of mind allows for a strong and potentially convincing response to the discontinuation arguments, as opposed 
to leaving contemporary metaphysical accounts of consciousness vulnerable to these epistemic charges, 
metaphysicians of mind ought to take this claim seriously.  
 
The second motivation for the view is most important. This is the claim that an IBE analysis of the metaphysics 
of mind is plausible not only from a dialectical point of view in meta-metaphysics and the metaphysics of 
science, but also ought to be accepted on the basis that it fits and accounts for what metaphysicians of mind 
actually do​; that is, to borrow the term from philosophy of science, it provides an analysis of the 
meta-metaphysics of consciousness which is ​descriptively adequate​. Recall the broad outline of contemporary 
dialectic in the metaphysics of mind outlined in Chapter 1. There, it was explained that contemporary 
developments in debates over the ontological status of consciousness have been ​both​ a posteriori - take the 
debates following the acceptance of causal closure to be a case in point - as well as priori in nature, with the 
majority of discussion falling under this latter description. 
 
 This varied nature of contemporary debate plausibly serves as a central explanandum on any potential account 
of the meta-metaphysics of consciousness. However, it is one that an IBE analysis of the metaphysics of mind 
seems best placed to explain. On an IBE analysis of the metaphysics of mind, for example, we can make sense of 
the former a posteriori elements in terms of the attempt to demonstrate that various candidate theories of 
consciousness - namely, interactionist dualism - in light of recent empirical developments, no longer satisfy the 
empirical equivalence condition demanded by step (1) of the IBE analysis (with empirical evidence now pressing 
against it) and thus, are rejected as viable candidate hypotheses. Similarly, the attention and subsequent focus in 
contemporary debate on a priori arguments, both in the standard anti-physicalist or mental causation cases, 
along with the more recent naturalistic non-physicalist programme (which, recall, takes as a ​holistic​ treatment of 
non-physicalism beyond narrow consideration of the anti-physicalist arguments as its broad mandate) is 
explained by appeal to step (2) of an IBE framework. That is, the a priori arguments in metaphysics of mind 
following causal closure are plausibly understood, on this view, as contributing to the sophisticated cost-benefit 
analysis of competing metaphysical theories, modelled on the super-empirical virtues implicated in IBE in 




The two considerations above are not conclusive arguments for the claim that metaphysics of mind proceeds via 
inference to the best explanation. In the absence of compelling alternatives they do, however, provide strong 
motivation to accept such a claim. In the remainder of this thesis I assume that an IBE analysis of the 
metaphysics of consciousness, at least, restricted to the debate concerning consciousness’ ontological status, is 
broadly correct. The following argument can thus be understood conditionally: ​if ​the metaphysics of mind is 
correctly analysed in terms of IBE, what follows with respect to the demands placed on contemporary 
metaphysical accounts of consciousness to engage with the recent empirical work on its neural basis? (and 
moreover, with respect to the ability of contemporary theories to meet such demands). Here, the next piece of 
the methodological puzzle - the recent work in the metaphysics of neuroscience - becomes key. This is because, 
as I will argue below, this metaphysically informed work in the philosophy of neuroscience, broadly 
understood, has significant implications for answering the question just posed, in virtue of providing a novel 
way of interpreting the demand for ​empirical equivalence​ of theories dictated by an IBE analysis of the 
metaphysics of mind. That is, when it comes to the satisfaction of empirical equivalence by competing 
metaphysical​ theories of consciousness, there may be a further or stronger sense of empirical equivalence 
suggested by the emergence of the metaphysics of neuroscience beyond that utilised in cases of theory 
underdetermination in science, which - I will argue - it is nevertheless reasonable to expect of candidate 
metaphysical hypotheses with respect to consciousness to satisfy . 73
 
 
    3 2 Observational and Metaphysical Empirical Equivalence 
 
If, as I have suggested, the construction and subsequent debate over competing accounts of consciousness’ 
ontological status proceeds broadly via inference to the best explanation, the demand on contemporary 
73Before continuing, it is worth briefly addressing two potential alternative accounts of the meta-metaphysics of mind 
suggested by literature in recent metaphysics of science. These are meta-metaphysical accounts of consciousness which 
either (i) reject methodological naturalism on the basis of the claim that, in addition to its distinctive subject matter, 
metaphysics is also autonomous from science with respect to its methodology - being, for example, ​exclusively a priori​ in 
nature (Lowe 2011;101), or, alternatively, (ii) endorse a deflationary instrumentalist view of the metaphysics of 
consciousness, which rejects the claim that metaphysical inquiry is capable of generating knowledge of the fundamental 
nature of objective reality, but nevertheless leaves room for its having various pragmatic or instrumental benefits (see for 
example, Beebee 2018, French and McKenzie 2011, Godfrey-Smith ​unpublished​). This last alternative, suggested by the 
more recent discontinuation arguments, should be unattractive to metaphysicians of mind for obvious reasons. The 
second, whilst perhaps suited to some areas of contemporary metaphysics (see Tahko and Morganti; (2017;3) for an 
argument that Lowe’s analysis is best placed to explain the methodology of metaphysicians engaged in conceptual analysis), 
seems ill suited as an account of the meta-metaphysics of consciousness for the reasons given above. That is, it is difficult to 
see how this analysis can account for the a posteriori developments central to the metaphysics of mind outlined above (and 
thus ought to be rejected on the basis of descriptively inadequacy) and provide a response to the prominent 
discontinuation arguments. 
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metaphysical theories to engage with neuroscientific research on consciousness - that is, the proper account of 
the relationship between these two lines of research - is easily identified. Simply stated, an explanationist analysis 
of metaphysics demands that competing ontological accounts of consciousness must satisfy Empirical 
Equivalence. In order to be considered an adequate metaphysical theory of consciousness, that is, whose costs 
and benefits, internal inconsistencies and viability etc. are worth debating in step (2) of the methodological 
process, a given ontological account of consciousness (non-reductive physicalism, Russellian monism etc.) 
must, as a minimal condition, be ​consistent​ with all available empirical data emerging from the new neuroscience 
of consciousness .  74
 
Given the lack of philosophical clarity on the question of the relationship between the metaphysics and 
neuroscience of consciousness that we began with in Chapter 1, the identification of this criterion via the 
explanationist defense, as a means of systematically addressing the empirical adequacy of competing 
metaphysical accounts of consciousness, constitutes good progress. However, this claim leaves open a crucial 
question which needs addressing if this criterion is to be properly informative viz. what does empirical 
equivalence amount to specifically, and how is the demand for empirical equivalence of competing theories best 
interpreted in ​metaphysical​ cases of theory underdetermination by empirical evidence?  
 
The provision of an account of empirical equivalence in the standard scientific cases discussed above is itself a 
substantive issue, whose comprehensive treatment goes well beyond the scope of this thesis. Fortunately, there is 
a well accepted definition of the empirical equivalency had by rival theories in science which has emerged as a 
result of the recent debates over theory underdetermination and scientific realism, which will suffice for our 
purposes here (namely, getting a clear understanding of what is meant by empirical equivalence in the scientific 
cases of IBE). This can be stated as follows: 
 
Observational Empirical Equivalence : A set of rival theories (T​1​, T​2​, T​3​...T​x​) are empirically equivalent at 75
time t iff (i) theoretical systems T​1​..T​x​ have the same class of observational consequences at t or (ii) the set of 
theories has the same class of empirical models at t. 
 
74Strictly speaking of course, rival ontological accounts of consciousness must be equivalent with respect to ​all​ relevant 
observational data, not just that produced by contemporary neuroscience, but I leave this here. 
75Tułodziecki (2012;315), Worrall (2011), Laudan and Leplin (1991), Psillos (1999). Following Tułodziecki’s assumption 
that a semantic or syntactic analysis makes no difference to assessments of empirical equivalence (on ease of translation 
from one to the other) I limit my focus in subsequent discussion to (i).  
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This observational account of empirical equivalence in science, which characterises empirical equivalence 
primarily in terms of the empirical ​indistinguishability ​or congruence of rival theories (Tulodziecki; 2012) 
serves as an obvious starting point for an account of empirical equivalence in the metaphysical case at hand. 
That is, in the first instance, we can interpret the demand on rival metaphysical theories of consciousness  M​T1 
and M​T2​ to be empirically equivalent in terms of the demand on  M​T1​ and M​T2​ to share ​all the same 
observational consequences​. On this view then, we can claim that M​T1​ and M​T2​ are empirically equivalent iff for 
every empirical prediction e made by M​T1​, M​T2​ also entails e . Indexing the demand for empirical equivalence 76
in this case to the neuroscience of consciousness, an observational interpretation of empirical equivalence yields 
the claim that metaphysical accounts of consciousness M​T1​ and M​T2​ are empirically equivalent with respect to 
this recent work iff they yield the same observational consequences in this context (that is, where the empirical 
prediction e above is one which is testable within this restricted empirical domain).  
 
The observational empirical equivalence just described serves as a plausible interpretation of the demand on 
ontological accounts of consciousness to be empirically equivalent as dictated by step (1) of the explanationist 
defense of metaphysics. Presumably, no ontological account of consciousness would be accepted as a plausible 
candidate hypothesis concerning the metaphysical nature of consciousness, and subject to subsequent a priori 
cost-benefit analysis, if it was empirically inequivalent in this observational sense. The rapid decline in support 
for interactionist dualism due to its lack of observational confirmation from modern neuroscience stands as 
testament to this claim. Moreover, the demand for observational equivalence, as the operational account of 
empirical equivalence in scientific cases of IBE, must presumably be a demand which is shared by metaphysical 
theories constructed via IBE if the methodological naturalist defense of the metaphysics of mind is to be viable. 
As such, it is plausible then, that observational equivalence is ​necessary​ for the empirical equivalence of rival 
metaphysical accounts of consciousness. The question remains however, is it sufficient? That is, can the 
76(Worrall 2011). The observational account of empirical equivalence just outlined in fact tracks two distinct definitions of 
empirical equivalence offered in the context of theory underdetermination, which are distinguished by their different 
explication of the term ‘observational consequences’. The first, ‘naive’ view, defines the relevant observational 
consequences of a set of rival theories in terms of results or predictions which are​ directly testable​. On this view, two 
competing scientific theories (or rather, Duhemian theoretical systems) T1 and T2 are equivalent at t iff for every empirical 
prediction e made by T1, T2 also entails e - where e is a prediction capable of being ​directly experimentally tested or checked 
at t (Worrall 2011;162). This so-called ‘‘data equivalence’’ of rival theories (which I think captures much of what is 
intuitively meant by empirical equivalence in explanationist defenses of metaphysics as that which ‘‘ share all the same 
empirical success’’) has since been deemed to be insufficient for genuine empirical equivalence (e.g. Worrall 2011, 2010) 
and has been subsequently replaced by a more stringent account of prediction e in the broad definition above in terms of 
the total observational consequences of a theory which are ‘‘expressed in a purely observational vocabulary’’ (Laudan and 
Leplin 1991). This latter account of equivalence is supposed to better accommodate, for example, the choice between 
Copernican and Ptolemaic models of the solar system which stand data equivalent, despite being empirically inequivalent. 
In my discussion here, I take this observational account to incorporate both of these more specific senses of equivalence. 
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observational account exhaustively capture the demand on ontological accounts of consciousness to be 
congruent and equivalent with respect to the large body of recent empirical work on its neural basis?  
 
Before the emergence and widespread acknowledgement of scientific metaphysics as a fruitful research 
programme, such a claim might well have been plausible. However, the recent work in meta-metaphysics 
described in section 1 gives us strong reason to doubt the claim that satisfaction of observational equivalence by 
two rival ontological theories of consciousness is sufficient to establish their​ empirical​ equivalence. By all 
accounts, the metaphysics of science as a metaphysical research programme is revealing - in no uncertain terms - 
that the rich variety of explanatory theories and experimental practices in science, including those in 
neuroscience and related fields, are themselves ​metaphysically loaded​, entailing or ‘bringing with them’ a set of 
precise metaphysical claims and commitments. Furthermore, this metaphysically informed work in the 
philosophy of neuroscience, and the metaphysical structure of neuroscientific explanations this reveals, is not 
detached or ‘free floating’ with respect to the relevant empirical results implicated in observational equivalence - 
so as to be ​discretionary ​with respect to acceptance of the results in these fields- but instead are tightly connected 
to them. That is, being, as described, constrained in the first instance directly by these practices via a 
methodological commitment to descriptive adequacy.  
 
When it comes to the empirical equivalence of rival ​metaphysical​ theories of consciousness with respect to a 
given field then, there now appears to be a further condition beyond observational equivalence which demands 
satisfaction. This is the securement of the consistency or compatibility of these competing ontological theories 
with the best account of the rich metaphysical structure entailed by the theories and successful explanatory 
practices within this domain. In other words, the recent emergence of scientific metaphysics allows for a novel 
understanding of the demand for empirical equivalence on metaphysical theories of consciousness constructed 
via IBE, which can be stated as follows: 
 
Metaphysical Empirical Equivalence: . A set of rival metaphysical theories (MT​1​, MT​2​, MT​3​...MT​x​) are 77
empirically equivalent with respect to domain y at t iff (i) they are observationally equivalent at t and (ii) they are 
consistent, or equally compatible, with our best account of the metaphysical commitments of y at t.  
 
The demand for metaphysical, in addition to observational, equivalence on rival metaphysical theories, if viable, 
potentially sets the bar for the empirical adequacy of ontological accounts of consciousness significantly higher. 
77See also Worrall’s (2011) discussion of the necessity of various theoretical commitments in securing empirical 
equivalence. 
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This implication, I think, ought to be embraced by proponents of explanationist accounts of the metaphysics of 
consciousness. The establishing of the empirical adequacy of competing metaphysical theories in step (1) of 
IBE, prior to subsequent assessment of a theory’s overall explanatory power, is crucial, and, as explained, is 
designed to secure the theory’s complete empirical congruence or​ indistinguishability​. If methodological 
naturalists are serious about meeting this minimal prior commitment (and, by extension, securing the proper 
continuity of scientific and philosophical knowledge in this case) the mere​ ​compatibility of metaphysical 
theories of consciousness with our best accounts of the​ metaphysical commitments​ of neuroscience ought 
reasonably to be secured .  78
 
In light of the above, the alternative methodological claim regarding the relationship between the contemporary 
metaphysics and neuroscience of consciousness I am proposing should be clear. This is straightforward: that 
close attention to, and reflection on, the methodological practices adhered to in the metaphysical debates on 
consciousness (IBE) reveals that the correct approach to the metaphysics of consciousness is one which looks in 
the first instance to secure the ​metaphysical equivalence​ of rival ontological accounts of consciousness (which 
has currently been ignored). That is to say, the right approach to formulating metaphysical accounts of 
consciousness and its ontological status is one which starts from close attention to the details of the emerging 
metaphysics of neuroscience, and specifically,  of the neuroscience of consciousness, and utilises these to 
construct competing positive (empirically adequate) metaphysical accounts of consciousness - from which 
traditional-style a priori metaphysical theorising can begin. To state this using more familiar terminology, when 
attempting to answer the hard problem of consciousness (viz. ‘why and how’ a given set of physical processes 
should give rise to subjective experience), we should start from attention to the metaphysical commitments 
entailed by the solutions of the so-called ‘easy problems’ of consciousness, which are provided by cognitive 
neuroscience and related empirical fields. Here, the claim is not that attention to these empirically informed 
metaphysical commitments will necessarily ​solve​ the hard problem (and/or provide compelling answers to its 
related argumentative formulations) but rather, that the framework for answering the easy problems of 
consciousness collectively place empirically motivated ​epistemically prior​ constraints on the metaphysical space 
of its potential a priori solutions (see figure 2). 
78This constraint, which is significantly more ​robust​ than observational equivalence, ought also to be attractive insofar as it 
provides the explanationist defender of the metaphysics of consciousness with the potential resources to combat a number 
of the recent epistemic arguments pressed against the methodological practices of traditional metaphysics (see below). 
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F​igure 2:​ Easy vs Hard Problems and Metaphysical Equivalence 
 
Before continuing onto the exposition of the alternative methodological approach which this discussion 
suggests, it is necessary here to briefly return to the arguments I presented in the previous chapter against the 
neutrality argument. The distinction between the two types of empirical equivalence made in this chapter 
allows for a restatement of the argument presented in Chapter 2, which reinforces those arguments and situates 
them within this broader methodological context. This can be stated as follows: that whilst Chalmers’ and (to a 
greater extent) Kriegel look to, or attempt to secure the ​observational ​equivalence of competing ontological 
accounts of consciousness, the neutrality argument fails primarily on the basis that Chalmers and Kriegel fail to 
secure, or even address, the ​metaphysical equivalence ​of rival ontological accounts with the neuroscience of 
consciousness (which, given the preliminary discussions of causation and constitution in the mechanistic 
interpretation of the NCC, and the identity claim in IIT, looked difficult to establish). That is, from the 
discussion above we can see that Kriegel was ​correct​ in thinking that the neutrality of the neuroscience of 
consciousness would result from the claim that competing metaphysical theories are empirically equivalent with 
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respect to this field, but that he was nevertheless mistaken in assuming that we could infer the truth of this claim 
from the observational or data equivalence of one or two (or even all) such metaphysical theories .  79
 
4 A Neuroscience-First Approach: A Proposal   
 
As explained above, the alternative methodological approach that is suggested by the discussion of recent 
developments in meta-metaphysics covered in this chapter takes as its broad mandate the securing (in the first 
instance) of the empirical - that is, metaphysical​ and​ observational - equivalence of competing metaphysical 
theories of consciousness within an explanationist or IBE framework. However, as should be evident from the 
different objections discussed in Chapter 2, there are various ways in which this broad mandate can be 
implemented. As I understand it, this alternative approach to the metaphysics of consciousness which looks to 
use the emerging work in the neuroscience of consciousness to secure the empirical equivalence of theories in 
this sense, is constituted by the pursuit of the two questions, considered in turn: 
 
(1)​ What are the unified set of metaphysical claims or commitments emerging from careful philosophical 
examination of the neuroscience of consciousness? 
 
(2)​ Which leading metaphysical theories of consciousness are consistent or compatible with this set of claims? 
(or are these instead suggestive of a single ontological picture?) 
 
Together, these constitute the alternative ‘Neuroscience-First’ methodological approach to the metaphysics of 
mind. With respect to the first of these questions, it is important to distinguish two distinct approaches which 
can be taken, both of which are reflected in the two objections to the neutrality argument discussed in the 
previous Chapter. First and most obviously in light of the discussion in this chapter, one can work towards 
identification of the metaphysical commitments of the relevant empirical work by adopting a ​discipline-specific 
approach. That is, an approach which takes as its starting point the ontological commitments of the (in this 
case, mechanistic) explanatory practices characteristic of neuroscience and related fields, and applies these, 
where appropriate, to relevant work in the neuroscience of consciousness. An example of this approach in 
relation to the NCC framework is provided in the next Chapter. As already explained, however, the 
contemporary  research produced as part of this NCC framework (to which the discipline specific approach 
looks to be best suited) is not exhaustive of neuroscientific work on consciousness, which is also comprised of 
79As I argued in 2.2 and 2.3, I think that as things currently stand, Kriegel fails to establish even the observational or data 
equivalence of all of the standard metaphysical theories, insofar as he only examines the observational equivalence of two of 
these candidate hypotheses (viz. constitutive non-reductive physicalism and epiphenomenalism). 
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significant work relating to and testing comprehensive empirical theories or models of consciousness. An 
alternative and distinct​ theory-approach ​to (1) then, attempts to answer this question by drawing out the main 
metaphysical commitments of these leading theories as they emerge from the science of consciousness . A 80
complete answer to (1) will thus require the integration of discipline and theory-specific approaches, however - 
as we shall see in the next chapter - there is plenty of work to be done separately within the different approaches 
before this can be done.  
 
5 The Metaphysics of Consciousness, Naturalised? 
 
The Neuroscience-First Approach just outlined constitutes a significant departure from the usual 
methodological approach in the metaphysics of consciousness, according to which metaphysical and 
neuroscientific research operate in robust methodological independence from one another. On this alternative 
view, contemporary empirical research in the neuroscience of consciousness and its metaphysical foundations 
are not independent from metaphysical theorising on consciousness but rather play an indispensable role within 
it, serving as the mutual starting constraints on rival empirically adequate ontological theories of consciousness. 
In this chapter, I have argued primarily that this approach follows from two claims which have gained 
plausibility in light of recent developments in meta-metaphysics (i) that the metaphysics of mind proceeds 
broadly via inference to the best explanation from empirical equivalent theories and (ii) that empirical 
equivalence in metaphysical cases of IBE demands not only observational or data equivalence of rival theories, 
but also congruence with our best (carefully extracted) metaphysical theories of neuroscience. 
 
As should be evident from my introduction and explanation of (i) and (ii), both of these claims used to motivate 
this alternative methodological approach have emerged as a result of the broader debate in meta-metaphysics 
which concerns the extent to which traditional styles of metaphysics and its methodological practices (of which, 
metaphysics of mind is presumably a part of) are epistemically inadequate and require replacement. One of the 
obvious questions left over from this discussion is thus where a Neuroscience-First Approach to the 
metaphysics of consciousness (or one like it) leaves the metaphysics of mind in the context of such debates. A 
80As such, this would include work like the recent metaphysical treatments of IIT discussed in the last chapter (Mindt 
2017, Morch 2017), along with metaphysically informed discussions of the PEM frameworks, global workspace theories 
and (if and when this emerges) the comprehensive theoretical framework in consciousness science which unifies these 
disparate frameworks. I also take this theory-specific approach to incorporate the emerging work on the metaphysics of 
global states or levels of consciousness (Bayne & Howhy 2016) and the recent empirical work proposed as part of the 
meta-problem research programme (Chalmers forthcoming). This fits nicely into this methodological Neuroscience-First 




further benefit of the Neuroscience-First approach, and a ​prima facie​ reason to take the view seriously in this 
context beyond the argument presented here, is as follows. That, whilst this approach relies on and utilises an 
explanationist analysis of metaphysics, it nonetheless has the resources to satisfy a number of recent criteria 
proposed by scientific metaphysicians for epistemically adequate metaphysical theorising. That is, this 
alternative methodological approach places empirically motivated constraints on possible theories of 
consciousness which are ​robust​ and demanding (Bryant 2017) (such that the number of potential metaphysical 
theories of consciousness will be reduced, and epistemic warrant secured) and also, allows for instances of theory 
underdetermination in metaphysics of mind which are both ​transient ​in nature (that is, broken by new data) 
and specific to given domain (neuroscience) and thus, on certain accounts, properly analogous to purported 
cases of empirical underdetermination in science (Ladyman 2012).  In other words, the Neuroscience-First 
Approach outlined here has further benefits as a methodological approach to the metaphysics of consciousness 
insofar as it provides a ​prima facie ​example - pending closer philosophical examination - of how the metaphysics 






















In the previous chapter I argued that the standard methodological approach to the metaphysics of 
consciousness ought to be replaced by one which begins with the identification and examination of the 
metaphysical commitments of emerging work on its neural basis. Whilst this methodological debate is 
philosophically interesting in its own right, the proper measure of an alternative methodology is surely in its 
usefulness and application to contemporary debates.  My aim in this fourth chapter is thus to demonstrate how 
this alternative Neuroscience-First approach can be implemented in current discussions, and can be used to 
constructively inform ongoing debates in the metaphysics of mind. Thus far, the target and focus of my 
discussion has been exclusively on a series of methodological claims concerning contemporary theorising in the 
metaphysics of consciousness, and how this ought to proceed; the viability and details of the various rival 
metaphysical accounts which have emerged as a result of the standard methodological procedures - that which 
the majority of contemporary work in the metaphysics of consciousness is concerned with - has been left 
undiscussed. This has been deliberate, and reflects the prior objective to provide a detailed and constructive 
discussion of the methodology and meta-metaphysics of consciousness which is free from metaphysical ideology 
and first-order agendas . Here however, the aim is to move away from this focus on methodology and begin to 81
consider some of the implications this Neuroscience-First approach might have for specific first-order concerns 
in recent metaphysics of mind.  
The plan for this final chapter is as follows.​ ​In​ Section 1​ I return to the recent mechanistic interpretation of the 
Neural Correlates of Consciousness research programme which was introduced in Chapter 2. As this is 
paradigmatic of the discipline-specific approach outlined in the previous chapter which draws directly on recent 
work in the metaphysics of neuroscientific explanation, the mechanistic interpretation of the NCC programme 
and its metaphysical structure serve as a natural starting point for the implementation of the Neuroscience-First 
Approach. After briefly recapping the arguments and discussion presented in  2.2.1, I outline the main claim 
which emerges from this mechanistic interpretation of the search for NCCs. Whilst I am in broad agreement 
with the motivation and interpretation of the programme offered by Neisser (2012), the account presented here 
differs from Neisser’s in details, and amounts to the claim that the search for neural correlates of consciousness 
is best interpreted on a mechanistic framework not in terms of mechanistic causes, but as the search for the 
multi-leveled neural mechanisms​ which are constitutive​ of consciousness. That is, I argue that Neisser’s 
mechanistic definition of the NCC programme is currently inadequate as it mistakenly conflates constitutive 
with etiological forms of mechanistic explanation, which is unsuited to this experimental context (Craver 
2007;74).  
81As such, I have tried to suspend judgement on the familiar first-order issues whilst considering these methodological 
questions. 
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If this constitutive mechanistic analysis of the search for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness is broadly 
correct, we should expect this explanatory mandate to be reflected in the common experimental paradigms 
utilised by researchers working in this research programme. In ​Section 2, ​building on Neisser’s previous 
discussion of Binocular Rivalry studies, I argue that the standard experimental paradigms used as part as the 
contemporary search for the NCCs support this particular constitutive-mechanistic analysis. Taking the recent 
report and ‘no-report’ based paradigms in content-based studies as a key example (Aru et al. 2012 Tsuchiya et al. 
2015), I argue that these and similar experimental approaches are best understood as instances of so-called 
‘Activation Experiments’ (Craver 2007, Kastner, 2017) viz. a specific type of top-down interlevel experiment 
commonly used to identify ​constitutive components ​of a given neural mechanism. After having provided this 
further motivation for the mechanistic analysis of the NCC programme, in ​Section 3 ​I argue that this provides 
the basis of a novel argument against contemporary type-identity views of consciousness. This takes as central 
the straightforward claim that ontological accounts which claim that consciousness is​ identical​ to some neural 
process or mechanism are in tension with the widely accepted view that the relationship between mechanism 
and phenomenon in constitutive mechanistic explanations are non-causal ​constitutive ​dependency relations. I 
conclude with a discussion of further work to be done as part of this mechanistic project applied to the 
neuroscience of consciousness. 
1 Causal vs Constitutive Mechanistic Explanation 
In Chapter 2, I argued that a mechanistic analysis of the NCC programme gives us reason to reject the claim 
that neuroscience, as it pertains to the study of consciousness, aims at the production of purley correlational 
facts. According to this mechanistic analysis (Neisser 2012, along with Revonsuo 2000, Vernazzani 2015 and 
Seth 2009), the dominant form of explanation in neuroscience, as detailed extensively by the New Mechanists, 
places interpretational demands on an account of the NCC programme, such that this is best characterised as 
the search for an ​explanation ​of consciousness via the description and identification of the multi-levelled ​neural 
mechanisms​ responsible for its production. When applied to both content-specific and stated-based approaches 
constitutive of the contemporary NCC programme, I argued that this mechanistic analysis supports the claim 
that researchers working in NCC programme are searching for facts relating first person and third person relata 
which are metaphysically specific and ​non-correlational​, in a manner which would render the neutrality 
argument unsound .  82
82 A detailed description of mechanistic explanation (in addition to the Neural Correlates of Consciousness research 
programme) has been provided earlier in the thesis. See Chapter 2 (2.2.1) and Chapter 1 (1.2.1), along with the references 
included there for more extensive treatments of these research programmes. As before, I limit my discussion of mechanistic 
explanation here primarily to the influential account offered in Craver (2007) (C.f.Bechtel  2005, 2007, Darden 2008, 
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But what account of this non-correlational relation obtaining between a given conscious content (or individual 
global states) and neural mechanisms does a mechanistic analysis of the NCC programme  demand? In Chapter 
2, I stopped short of endorsing a particular view of this relationship. As explained previously, in his mechanistic 
account of the NCC programme, Joseph Neisser (2012) proposes a ​causal-mechanistic​ analysis of the NCC 
programme. That is, Neisser argues that the type of facts pursued by NCC researchers are best characterised as 
causal​; a claim which is thought to follow as a consequence of the broad mandate adopted by the New 
Mechanists to situate diverse cognitive phenomena within the ​causal structure​ of the world (Craver 2007). This 
causal-mechanistic analysis is summed up in the revised definition of an NCC that Neisser provides (which he 
restricts to content-specific NCC approaches) which goes as follows: 
‘‘An NCC can be defined as a minimal neural system N such that states of N are underlying ​causes ​of a 
measurable change in consciousness, where a given state of N, as the causally relevant component of an 
embodied mechanism, is a mutually manipulable ​INUS ​condition for the specified aspect of the conscious 
state’’ (2012, 689). 
 
This causal-mechanistic analysis provided by Neisser was useful for the argument I presented in Chapter 2 
(which aimed to demonstrate that a mechanistic analysis of the NCC programme ought to give us reason to 
reject the standard correlational reading of this empirical research) and provides a concrete example of how the 
NCC project might be analysed within a mechanistic explanatory framework. The causal-mechanistic analysis 
of the NCC project given above however is not the only analysis of this research that can be provided by 
attention to the details of recent literature on mechanistic explanation. According to an alternative analysis of 
the NCC research programme, alluded to in my previous discussion, contemporary researchers working in the 
NCC project are not looking to locate the mechanistic ​causes​ of a given content (or states) of consciousness, but 
rather are looking to identify the acting component-entities of the neural mechanisms which are​ constitutive​ of 
the relevant aspect of consciousness . This distinction between competing causal-mechanistic and constitutive 83
mechanistic analyses of the NCC project (which nevertheless share the same broad motivation) reflects the 
common distinction found in the new mechanist literature between etiological and ​constitutive​ forms of 
mechanistic explanation . Whilst in etiological mechanistic explanations phenomena are explained by their 84
prior mechanistic causes, in constitutive mechanistic explanations  - which are arguably most prominent in 
neuroscience - higher level cognitive phenomena are explained instead by the identification and description of 
Glennan 2005, 2017). A comprehensive discussion of the NCC programme and its recent experimental developments, 
which my discussion below targets, can be found in Koch et al. (2016) and  Howhy & Bayne (2016).  
83 This is suggested in Revonsuo’s comprehensive discussion of the NCC framework in 2000 (chp1-3). 
84See Salmon (1984), Craver (2007, 65-72), Kaiser and Krickel (2016;7-9).  
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the neural mechanism which constitutes or ‘underlies’ it . This latter form of explanation, which is most 85
commonly discussed in the philosophy and metaphysics of neuroscience, was outlined and explained in 
Chapter 2. As a way of brief recap, its main claims can be summarised as follows (1-5): 
 
1.  That (neuro) scientific explanation proceeds by uniformly identifying and describing multilevel neural 
mechanisms that are responsible for diverse higher level cognitive phenomena. This typically involves 
the integration of numerous fields and empirical methodologies. 
 
 
Figure 1​ (Constitutive) Mechanistic Explanation (adapted from Craver 2007;7). 
 
2.  On  this dominant form of mechanistic explanation - depicted in figure 1 - the phenomena ( ‘S’s 
ψ-ing’) is explained by the temporal and spatial organisation of the ​activities of the component entities 
85These two types of explanation are thus distinguished on the basis of the relationship - viz. causal or constitutive - 
obtaining between the explanandum and the explanans (Kaiser and Krickel (2016,7) and together reflect the two ways in 
which a phenomenon can be located within the causal nexus (Craver and Tabery 2017). Standard examples of etiological 
mechanistic explanations include neurotransmitter release (Craver 2007,22) - in which the release of neurotransmitters into 
the synaptic cleft is explained by its previous causes (Ca2+ channels opening, the influx of Ca2+ etc.) - along with 
explanations of adaptive evolutionary outcomes (Skipper and Milstein (2005); Barros (2008); Glennan (2009) and the 
formation of a gamete (Glennan (2002)). In contrast, examples of constitutive mechanistic explanations in neuroscience 
include the case of spatial memory discussed in Chapter 2 (Craver 2007) and the long-term potentiation of synapses of 
neurons Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005). 
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(Xs’ ϕ-ings) which make up the mechanism. These are interconnected via various causal relationships 
(arrows). 
3.  These acting component-entities are in turn explained by the identification and description of their 
underlying neural mechanism, such that mechanistic explanation gives rise to a hierarchy of ​levels​ or 
nested mechanisms (the red dotted lines), which are individuated locally on the basis of the individual 
components of a neural mechanism .  86
4. These components (Xs’ ϕ-ings) of a given mechanism for S are determined and identified on the basis 
of two conditions (153-157):  
(i) spatiotemporal parthood; X must be a spatiotemporal part of the system whose behaviour is to be 
explained (Krickel 2017). And  
(ii) Xs’ ϕ-ings and S’s ψ-ing must be ​mutually manipulable​ viz. A  part is constitutively relevant 
component  in a mechanism if one can change the behavior of the mechanism as a whole by intervening 
to change the behavior of the component ​and​ one can change the behavior of the component by 
intervening to change the behavior of the mechanism as a whole . 87
5. Crucially, on this form of mechanistic explanation, the relationship between the explanandum (the 
higher level cognitive phenomenon) and the explanans (the neural mechanism) is said to be one of 
constitution​ (indicated by the black dotted lines in figure 1). That is, the acting entities which constitute 
the mechanism (Xs’ ϕ-ings) are spatially and temporally ​contained within​ the phenomenon (S’s ψ-ing) . 
This is indicated by the way in which phenomena are often said to be explained by their ‘underlying 
mechanism’ which ‘exhibit’ or are responsible for them. 
The main claim which emerges as a result of a constitutive-mechanistic analysis of the NCC programme then, 
and that which I want to make clear going forward, is that this analysis implies that the NCC researchers - both 
in content and state-based approaches - are best understood as searching for the neural mechanisms responsible 
for consciousness in this ​constitutive​ non-causal sense (as described in 1-5). On a constitutive-mechanistic 
analysis of contemporary NCC research, the specific non-correlational relationship between the relevant 
86 That is, that ‘‘X’s ’ ϕ-ing is at a lower mechanistic level than S’s  ψ-ing if and only if X’s  ϕ-ing is a ​component​ of the 
mechanism for S’s ψ-ing’’ (Craver 2007;189). 
87Again, as explained previously, the viability of this criterion, which Craver characterises formally in terms of 
Woodwardian interventions​ (2007153-155) is hotly disputed (Leuridan 2012, Baumgartner & Gebharter 2016, Romero 
2015). The main worry here is that there is a tension or inconsistency in Craver’s account insofar as interventionism is an 
account of​ causation​ and thus not suited to an analysis of constitution relations. See Romero (2015) Baumgartner & 
Gebharter ( 2016) and Krickel (​forthcoming​) for ways of resolving this inconsistency and retaining the constitution relation 
along mutual manipulability lines. 
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(hierarchically ordered) neural mechanisms and the aspect of consciousness to be explained in each given case is 
one of constitution .  88
2. Motivating a Constitutive-Mechanistic Analysis of the NCC 
As explained in Chapter 2, Neisser’s argument in favour of his causal-mechanistic interpretation of the NCC 
programme was twofold: first, that such an analysis is plausible - and indeed is to be expected - from the 
perspective of philosophy of neuroscience, and second, that this analysis is supported by attention to the recent 
experimental paradigms employed in the search for content-specific NCCs. That is, Neisser argued that 
attention to the details of standard Binocular Rivalry paradigms supports his causal characterisation of the 
NCC programme insofar as the neuroscientists working in these paradigms are best understood as identifying 
the neural activations which​ make the difference​, in the Woodwardian ​causal ​interventionist sense utilised by 
the new mechanists, to the experience of the preferred stimulus under examination (683,686). The distinction 
between etiological and constitutive forms of explanation, and reasons we might have for thinking that the 
etiological form mechanistic explanation is operational in this NCC context, are not discussed. 
A closer look at the new mechanist literature however reveals that these two motivations that Neisser provides ( 
in the absence of such etiological-compelling reasons), in fact provide stronger support for a 
constitutive​-mechanistic analysis of the NCC research programme. Whilst etiological explanations are no doubt 
crucial in many areas of science (particularly evolutionary biology and related fields) including a small number 
of explanations in neuroscience, the ​dominant​ form of explanation which is discussed in this context - and that 
which Craver’s influential (2007) treatment of neuroscientific explanation is primarily concerned with - is 
constitutive mechanistic explanation. In the (valid) interest of providing an account of what neuroscientists 
working on consciousness are up to which is congruent and supported by recent work in philosophy of 
neuroscience and neuroscientific explanation, we ought to first consider a constitutive mechanistic analysis of 
the NCC research. Second and more importantly, there are also good reasons for thinking that, on closer 
examination, the constitutive-mechanistic (as opposed to causal) analysis of the NCC is better reflected in the 
experimental paradigms just mentioned, insofar as the latter appear to exhibit central discovery strategies for 
identifying the component-acting- entities of ​constitutive mechanisms ​as detailed by the New Mechanists.  
If a constitutive-mechanistic analysis of the NCC programme is correct, we should expect to see the broad 
explanatory mandate it recommends - viz. explanation via the identification of the neural mechanisms 
constitutive of consciousness (as outlined in 1-5) - reflected in the experimental practices and paradigms 
employed in recent empirical studies. In other words, these paradigms should reflect the search for constitutive 
88I discuss this constitution relation in more detail in section 3. 
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mechanisms which underlie the various aspects of consciousness . As we saw previously, in his discussion, 
Neisser argued that researchers using Binocular Rivalry paradigms in the search for content NCCs - viz. those in 
which distinct stimuli are presented to the eyes of a conscious subject, causing the conscious experience to shift 
between the different stimuli every couple of seconds - demonstrate evidence of searching for the neural 
activations which​ ​make the difference, in Woodwardian interventionist terms (2002, Craver 2007) to the 
experience of the relevant stimulus under examination in the study . Whilst Neisser argues that this provides 89
evidence for a causal characterisation (and this prima facie would seem to do so) attention to Craver’s account 
of constitutive mechanistic explanation -and in particular, his mutual manipulability criterion for constitutive 
relevance (4) which he formalises (not uncontroversially) in terms of ​Woodwardian interventions​ (153) - 
demonstrates that Neisser’s claim is equally compatible with a constitutive analysis of the NCC programme.  
Moreover, the common experimental paradigms used in NCC research just mentioned - namely, the 
report-based and no-report based Binocular Rivalry paradigms - in an NCC fit nicely into such a 
constitutive-mechanistic picture insofar as they appear to exemplify a top-down form of interlevel experiment 
(i.e. those used to describe constitutive mechanisms) which Craver (2007) and Kastner (2017;58)  refer to as 
‘Activation Experiments’​. One of four types of experiments used to test for ​constitutive relevance​ relations among 
entities and higher level phenomena, the experimenter in an activation experiment seeks to manipulate S in 
order to elicit its ψ-ing - in this case, causing the conscious stimuli to shift - in order to observe and identify Xs’ 
ϕ-ing viz. The brain activity recorded by fMRI in the fronto-parietal network and/or posterior cortical areas in 
these cases . The constitutive-mechanistic analysis finds support in the experimental practices utilised in 90
contemporary NCC practices. 
3. Reductive Physicalism and Constitutive Mechanistic Explanation 
Thus far I have outlined and motivated an alternative ​constitutive-mechanistic ​analysis of the NCC research 
programme. A full examination of the metaphysical consequences of this analysis for the metaphysics of mind 
and consciousness (that which would constitute the complete discipline-specific approach outlined in Chapter 
3) goes well beyond the scope of this Chapter. Here in conclusion however, I want to briefly examine a 
consequence of the main claim concerning the relationship between the neural mechanism(s) and explanandum 
phenomenon that this constitutive-mechanistic analysis provides. As stated above, if this analysis of the NCC 
research project is broadly correct, it follows that the relationship between the relevant (hierarchically ordered) 
89 ​See Tong et al. (1998), Logothetis et al. (2002), Tsuchiya and Koch (2005), Breitmeyer and Ogmen (2000). 
90 Koch et al. (2016). Here for example, the recent move in the content-based NCC approach towards no-report based 
paradigms and efforts to ‘screen off’ irrelevant neural activity relating to selective attention, self-monitoring or report, that 
precede or follow content NCCs can also be understood in mechanistic terms viz. as the attempt to separate constitutive 
and non-constitutive components acting entities in the relevant constitutive mechanisms. 
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neural mechanism identified by a completed NCC programme and [the aspect(s) of] consciousness explained is 
one of ​constitution. ​Whilst there has been much recent discussion about the nature of this constitution relation 
and its connection to constitution as understood in traditional metaphysics, and related notions of realization , 91
this mechanistic constitution relation is thought to ​minimally ​imply that the acting entities which constitute 
the mechanism (Xs’ ϕ-ings) are spatially and temporally ​contained within​, and give rise to, the phenomenon in 
question (S’s ψ-ing) . This is a substantial claim, and importantly, one which appears to be in tension with 92
certain reductive type-identity varieties of physicalism currently debated in the metaphysics of mind which 
typically claim that mental state types are ​identical ​with brain states types . The claim that I wish to put 93
forward then, is that the mechanistic analysis of the NCC programme presented in this Chapter provides the 
foundation of a novel argument against such views, on the basis that such identity claims are precluded by the 
sort of metaphysical relationship commonly thought to hold between mechanisms and phenomena detailed by 












91Harbecke (2010) and Gillett (2013). 
92 See Kaiser and Krickel (20168-9) for a defense of this minimal analysis which follows from Craver’s account of 
constitutive relevance. 
93 See Chapter 1.1. Levin (1991), McLaughlin (1999), Bechtel and McCauley (1999), Polger (2004), Kim [conditionally] 
(1998, 2005). As Polger (2009;823) writes: ‘‘The identity theory holds that mental states are identical to brain states – not 
merely correlated with them, caused by them, realized by them, superadded to them, etc’’. 
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